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 The surge in mass protest movements against authoritarian regimes around the world 
is raising questions about the reasons, motives and timing of such risky political activity. 
The hailing of social media as an enabler for contentious political action raises questions 
regarding the political impact of these new technologies, and how they may play a role in 
fomenting mass protests. A process-tracing analysis of four major protest movements will 
serve to examine the structural qualities of social media, and whether their particular use 
by activists and disgruntled publics is helping to spur mass disobedience and protest 
activity. The movements in Egypt in 2011, Iran in 2009, Turkey in 2013 and Ukraine in 
2013 will serve to infer a broadly generalizable theory about social media’s role in 
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Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance 




The introduction of the Internet in political affairs has altered the relationship between 
citizens and their government by creating a space for users to challenge media 
censorship, organize activist action and disseminate contentious political opinions. In 
recent years speculation regarding the role played by new communications platforms 
such as Facebook and Twitter during episodes of contentious action has occasionally 
overshadowed the role played by the actual protesters who risked their lives in the name 
of ideals such as freedom and democracy. Most notably, the Arab Spring of 2011 
engendered a wave of speculation and scholarly research regarding the role of social 
networks in fomenting and maintaining revolutions that led to the eventual toppling of 
long established dictatorships. Such is the focus on these sites that Iran’s 2009 upheaval 
has been dubbed a ‘Twitter Revolution’, and the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 a 
‘Facebook Revolution.’ These monikers suggest that social networking may have played 
a defining role in the upheavals, even bearing the brunt of the responsibility for 
instigating and sustaining the revolts. Despite celebrations of the “emancipatory power of 
communication technologies,” little is know about how new media reshape contemporary 
political movements and affect the size, duration and frequency of protest activity.
2
 
Moreover Iran’s 2009 post-electoral upheaval failed in bringing about regime change or 
even a vote recount. This - coupled to the fact that successful revolutions have taken 
                                                        
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution(1856), trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday,1955), 177. 





place long before the advent of social media - begs the question: What is the role of 
social media in fomenting popular upheaval?  
 
1.1) PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The revolutionary fervor that has gripped populations living under authoritarian regimes 
is the result of complex factors binding politics, economics, religion and technology. The 
questions of why these revolutions occurred will be pondered and debated by social 
scientists for years to come and is not within the scope of this thesis. The question that 
does arise in the aftermath of recent events is: 
What is the role played by political social networking in the lead-up to, and during 
episodes of contentious political action, and do social networks help activists 
mobilize mass protest movements? 
I will seek to answer this question by studying the different ways in which social media 
are used to mobilize and organize protest movements, analyzing events on the ground 
during recent episodes of mass protest in order to understand whether we can derive 
theoretical insight into the politics of social movements and revolutions. In order to 
answer the question, I will analyze four different cases that may allow me to develop a 
parsimonious theory with large explanatory power. In this respect I will focus specifically 
on the real-world impact of social media on contentious political behavior and will 
identify candidate conditions required for social media to have such an impact, allowing 
the theory to gain “prescriptive richness” and to lead to “tangible policy 
recommendations” if tested empirically.3 In order to develop this theory I will use an 
                                                        
3 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (New York: Cornell University 




inductive process, looking for causal relationships between phenomena that occurred 
prior to and during episodes of mass protest in Cairo in 2011, Tehran in 2009, Istanbul in 
2013, and Kiev in 2013. 
 
1.2) TERMS 
Before proceeding, I will define ‘social media’, and provide an example of its use over 
the course of the popular revolution that shook Egypt in early 2011. This will serve to 
shed some light on what is meant by the term ‘political social networking.’ Social media 
are an integral part of the “new media” landscape, which is composed primarily of 
“Internet-based communication technologies and methods that most people can readily 
differentiate from ‘old’ media.”4 Often labeled Web 2.0, these new media “generally 
involve user-generated content, interactivity, and dissemination through networks.”5 
 
Social Media 
Social Media are a “group of Internet‐ based applications that build on the foundations 
of Web 2.0, which allows the creation, exchange of user‐ generated content.”6 The most 
popular social media sites are user-generated content communities such as YouTube, 
Facebook and Twitter, which “in addition to text-based communication, enable the 
sharing of pictures, videos, and other forms of media.”7 These online communities are 
                                                        
4 Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Mark Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly and Ethan Zuckerman. “Blogs and 
Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics.” Peaceworks 65, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 
2011): 28. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, “Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities 
of Social Media,” Business Horizons 53, (2010): 61. 




increasingly employed by social movements throughout the world to share politically 
contentious information and foment popular upheaval against established authorities. In 
order to better describe how activists and protest communities used these tools, I will first 
provide a brief overview of their structural features.  
 
Facebook 
Facebook is a social networking interface that allows people to communicate with 
acquaintances, “friends, family and coworkers.”8 The company facilitates “the sharing of 
information” through a website and mobile applications that create digital versions of 
“people’s real world social connections.”9 Anyone can sign up for Facebook and interact 
with the people they know by simply ‘adding’ them to their friend list. Facebook also 
allows users to “form groups” where they may “speak freely to one another” through the 
exchange of public messages, photographs, pamphlets and video.
10
 While some users 
choose to exert a certain level of control over the visibility of their personal content and 
friend lists, others create pages and groups that are freely accessible and visible to anyone 
using the application. As of December 2013, the site had 1.23 billion “monthly active 
users,” with “approximately 81% of [the] daily active users …  outside the U.S. and 
Canada.”11 According to Facebook, in 2013, over “945 million monthly active users” 




                                                        
8 “About Facebook,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/peering/. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Samanth M. Shapiro, “Revolution, Facebook Style,” The New York Times, January 22, 2009. 





Twitter describes itself as “a real-time information network that connects you to the latest 
stories, ideas, opinions and news about what you find interesting.”13 Twitter allows users 
to send out messages - called ‘tweets’ – of up to 140 characters. Users can follow one 
another by simply clicking on a ‘follow’ function, which will make them recipients of all 
of the messages posted by the users they follow. Users can also communicate by creating 
and searching for hashtags such as #egypt. Hashtags are key words created by users 
preceded by a # symbol, denoting a term that has gained following and importance. At 
the time of writing, Twitter had “230 million active users,” posting “an average of 500 
million Tweets every day.”14 
 
Youtube 
YouTube “allows billions of people to discover, watch and share originally-created 
videos,” and acts as a “distribution platform for original video content creators.”15 
YouTube enables people to upload, share and promote video content on YouTube.com. 
Videos can subsequently be embedded and broadcast “across the Internet through 
websites, mobile devices, blogs, and email.”16 Youtube videos have a comment section 




Political social networking 
                                                        
13 “About Twitter,” Twitter, http://twitter.com/about/. 
14 “Who’s on Twitter?” Twitter, https://business.twitter.com/whos-twitter. 
15 “About Youtube,” Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/. 




Political social networking occurs when one or more of these online services are used to 
generate awareness, conversation, or propaganda regarding grievances and political 
issues that have achieved salience amongst activists. Social media are particularly useful 
for activist communities who wish to disseminate their ideas to a broader public, because 
they allow users to react and respond to the information, hence engaging in digitally 
mediated conversations which they can diffuse across their own personal networks. BBC 
journalist Paul Mason summarizes the functionalities of social media and how they are 
used by contemporary activists: 
Facebook is used to form groups, covert and overt—in order to establish those strong 
but flexible connections. Twitter is used for real-time organization and news 
dissemination, bypassing the cumbersome ‘newsgathering’ operations of the 
mainstream media. YouTube and the Twitter-linked photographic sites— Yfrog, 
Flickr and Twitpic—are used to provide instant evidence of the claims being made.17  
 
1.3) IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Recent events suggest that social media enhances the ability of repressed peoples to 
communicate and organize dissent quickly and effectively, helping them overturn 
regimes long perceived to be unshakable. The 2011 revolution in Egypt and the 2009 
upheaval in Iran are potent examples of the internet’s role in “empowering a range of 
non-state actors in ways that challenge all governments’ relationships with their 
citizens.”18 Yet despite the occurrence of a ‘Twitter revolution’ and a ‘Facebook 
revolution,’ “policymakers and scholars know very little about whether and how new 
media affect contentious politics.”19 Aggregation of data regarding the use social media 
                                                        
17 Paul Mason, “Global unrest: how the revolution went viral,” The Guardian, January 3, 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/03/how-the-revolution-went-viral 
18 Rebecca Mackinnon, “Internet Freedom' in the Age of Assange,” Foreign Policy, Feb. 11, 2011. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/17/internet_freedom_in_the_age_of_assange. 




during the revolutionary upheavals that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia in 2010-2011 does 
show that social media can be used effectively to connect and coordinate diverse groups 
and individuals in favor of targeted political activism, however the question of ‘how’ they 
do so remains unanswered.
20
 Initial analyses of the Egyptian uprising point to the 
likelihood that digital tools allow dissidents to bypass conventional media and create 
“freedom memes,” that “spread ideas about liberty and revolution to a surprisingly large 
number of people.”21 These findings are in tune with former US Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton’s “One Internet” speech, given in January 2010, in which she “articulated a 
powerful vision of the Internet as promoting freedom and global political transformation 
and rewriting the rules of political engagement and action.”22 Following the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011, “the emergence of a ‘Facebook revolution’ was read as a 
confirmation of the good work done by the US State department and its ‘internet 
freedom’ agenda. Topping the wave of self-congratulation in June 2011, Alec Ross, 
Hillary Clinton’s senior adviser, called the internet the ‘Che Guevara of the twenty-first 
century.’”23 Clinton’s view falls in line with a determinist analysis of technological 
innovation, which points to technology’s positive role in promoting activism and protest 
movements, and in spreading democratic ideals under autocratic regimes. However, the 
picture is much more complex than it appears.  The Iranian upheaval of 2009 failed to 
achieve its goals despite broad use of social media. Social media even became an 
impediment to the activists as it allowed the government to target and imprison specific 
                                                        
20 Lead researcher Philip N. Howard and his team at the Project on Information Technology and Political 
Islam recently published a working paper entitled “Opening Closed Regimes: What was the role of Social 
Media during the Arab Spring” in which they analyze tens of thousands of blog entries, twitter data entries 
and viral videos on Youtube, and analyzed the structure of the Egyptian political web. 
21 Howard, “Opening Closed Regimes,” 3. 
22 Sean Aday et al. “Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics,” 7. 




dissidents, tracking them down long after the revolution had been crushed. Moreover, 
2011 is not the first occurrence of sudden regime change instigated by popular revolt. 
Eastern Europeans lived through a similar period of upheaval whereby six states of the 
former USSR disbanded from the union and named their own national leaders in the 
space of one year in 1989, all without the help of social media. Hence the importance of 
asking: What is social media’s role in the creation and mobilization of mass protest 
movements?  Implied in this question is the fact that the size of a protest movement 
increases the likelihood of affecting change in political structures in that they force 
leaders to react, either by force or through acquiescence to demands. Both outcomes 
invariably change the relationship of citizens to the state. Hence, formulating a theory 
about the perceived causal relation between the occurrence of political social networking 
and the variable incidence of large democracy movements is important because it may 
help explain the sudden upsurge in the occurrence of mass protests in recent years, and 
may help predict how populations living under authoritarian rule may use these new 
technological tools and resources during future upheavals. 
 
2) LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1) OVERVIEW 
The impact of new media on the incidence of mass protest movements under 
authoritarian regimes is best understood through the frameworks of social movements 
and resource mobilization theory. These theoretical scholls seek to understand why, when 
and how do people mobilize, and what factors – structural, psychological or material 




the advent of social media, they will serve to establish the parameters within which 
specific technological innovations such as the internet and social media may spur popular 
participation in contentious activity. Starting in the 1990s, social movement theory 
combined the approaches previously developed by “structuralist and subjectivist 
scholars,” to develop a new model that “shows the tight fit between subjective 
perceptions of opportunities, and the structure of opportunities.”24 In their seminal work 
on the topic, McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as “a set of opinions and 
beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the 
social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”25 The actions taken by the 
aggrieved population affect other segments of the population as “actors respond to what 
others have done,” and as these groups interact “they build into the broad phenomena we 
collect under the label ‘social movement.’”26 Regarding protest action, Doug McAdam 
argues that the “structure of political opportunities” and “organizational strength” are its 
“two major determinants.”27 According to McAdam, these opportunities “will vary 
greatly over time” and “it is these variations that are held to be related to the ebb and flow 
of movement activity.”28 Citing McAdam, Kurzman writes “the crucial point … is that 
the political system can be more open or less open to challenge at different times.”29 
However “structural conditions … do not automatically translate into protest: They are 
                                                        
24 Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity And Perceived Opportunity In Social-Movement Theory: The 
Iranian Revolution Of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61 (1996): 153. 
25 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of 
Sociology 82 (1977): 1217. 
26 Daniel J Myers and Pamela Oliver, “Diffusion Models of Cycles of Protest as a Theory of Social 
Movements,” Paper prepared for presentation at the session on “Describing, Analyzing and Theorizing 
Social Movements” of Research Committee 48, Social Movements, Collective Action, and Social Change, 
at the Congress of the International Sociological Association, Montreal, July 30, 1998. 
www.nd.edu/~dmyers/cbsm/vol3/olmy.pdf . 
27 Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity And Perceived Opportunity In Social-Movement Theory,”153. 
28 In Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity And Perceived Opportunity In Social-Movement Theory,”153. 




rather are mediated by ‘cognitive liberation,’ an oppressed people's ability to break out of 
pessimistic and quiescent patterns of thought and begin to do something about their 
situation.”30 In 1996, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, developed “a framework intended 
to explain social movements’ emergence, development and outcomes by addressing three 
interrelated factors: mobilizing structures, opportunity structures and framing 
processes.”31 According to R. Kelly Garrett,  
Mobilizing structures refer to the mechanisms that enable individuals to organize and 
engage in collective action, including social structures and tactical repertoires… 
Opportunity structures refer to conditions in the environment that favor social 
movement activity … Framing processes are strategic attempts to craft, disseminate 




Social media may represent a crucial adjunct to all of these factors because it reveals the 
constant existence of activists which Sidney Tarrow calls “early risers”, who initiate 
protest activity “by making opportunities visible that had not been evident, and their 
actions may change the structure of opportunities.”33 The organizing, dissemination and 
coordination made available by social media effectively give early risers unprecedented 
means to get their message across to a broad spectrum of potential activists. In order to 
further explore social media’s role in the processes defined in McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald’s framework, I will discuss recent literature for clues as to how social media may 
impact mobilizing structures, opportunity structures and framing processes.  
2.2) MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES 
                                                        
30 Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity And Perceived Opportunity In Social-Movement Theory,” 154. 
31 In R. Kelly Garrett, “Protest in an Information Society: A Review of the Literature on Social Movements 
and the New ICTs,” Information, Communication and Society 9 (2006): 203. 
32 Garrett, “Protest in an Information Society,” 203-204. 




In 2006, Garrett updated McCarthy’s definition so as to apply it to an information 
society. Garrett divides ‘mobilization structures’ into three categories defined as 
‘participation levels’, ‘contentious activity’ and ‘organizational issues.’34 
 
2.2.1) Participation Levels 
Empirical studies conducted by Klandermans in 1984 and Karl-Dieter Opp in 1988 find a 
correlation “between the expected numerical strength of a protest movement and the 
likelihood of participation.”35 Moreover, scholars have long hypothesized that computer-
mediated communications would reduce “the transaction costs associated with 
organizing, thereby facilitating collective political action.”36 After analyzing six social 
movement case studies, Mark Bonchek found that the internet “reduces communication, 
coordination, and information costs, facilitating collective action by making it easier for 
groups to form, improving group's efficiency at providing collective goods, increasing the 
benefits from group membership, and promoting group retention through more informed 
decision-making.”37 Looking into the impact of specific social media networks, Feezell, 
Conroy and Guerrero find that participation “in online political groups strongly predicts 
offline political participation by engaging members online.”38 Khamis and Vaughn find 
that during the Egyptian protests of January 2011, Facebook’s “largest impact was in the 
mobilization of protesters. In fact, it could be said that the Egyptian revolution witnessed 
                                                        
34 Garrett, “Protest in an Information Society,” 206. 
35 Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity And Perceived Opportunity In Social-Movement Theory,” 155. 
36 In Mark S. Bonchek, “Grassroots in Cyberspace: Using Computer Networks to Facilitate Political 
Participation,” The Political Participation Project, MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. Paper presented 
at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, (Chicago, IL), 1. 
37 Bonchek,  “Grassroots in Cyberspace.” 
38 Jessica Feezell, Meredith Conroy, and Mario Guerrero. “Facebook is ... Fostering Political Engagement: 
A Study of Online Social Networking Groups and Offline Participation.” Paper prepared for the American 




the first incident of the politicization of Facebook on a grand scale to orchestrate major 
reform and drastic change.”39 One explanation of the Facebook impact is found in 
Garrett’s discussion of the existence of a causal link between “technology and 
participation” created by “the perception among individuals that they are members of a 
larger community by virtue of the grievances they share.”40 This argument is reinforced 
in Phillip N. Howard’s work on the use of new technologies in Iran’s 2009 uprising. He 
argues that the use of information technology in Iran “gave social movement leaders the 
capacity not only to reach out to sympathetic audiences overseas but also to reach two 
important domestic constituencies: rural, conservative voters who had few connections to 
the urban chaos; and the clerical establishment.”41  
 
2.2.2) Contentious Activity 
Central to my research will be the concept of ‘repertoires of contention’, which was 
theorized and operationalized by Charles Tilly. 
42
 Charles Tilly describes repertoires of 
contention as “the whole set of means a group has for making claims of different kinds on 
different individuals or groups.”43 The concept provides a framework for examining the 
development of tactics within social movements because it helps describe “the ways in 
which people act together in pursuit of shared interests (…) by identifying limited set of 
                                                        
39 Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution.” 
40 Garrett, “Protest in an Information Society,” 207. 
41 Philip N. Howard. The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and 
Political Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8. 
42 Sidney Tarrow, “The People's Two Rhythms: Charles Tilly and the Study of Contentious Politics. A 
Review Article,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 38 (1996), 592. 




routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of 
choice.”44 Tilly and Tarrow define the ensuing mechanisms of contention as: 
 Brokerage: production of new connection between previously unconnected sites. 
 Diffusion: spread of a form of contention, an issue, or a way of framing it from 
one site to another. 
 Coordinated action: two or more actors’ engagement in mutual signaling and 




Tarrow posits that innovation in forms of contention can be understood though two 
contrasting frameworks, “‘innovation at the margins’ and ‘moments of madness.’”46 
According to Brent Rolfe, “these approaches suggest that innovation emerges from 
creativity around existing repertoires, or from large leaps of creativity during times of 
crisis.”47 Repertoires therefore “evolve by absorbing those innovations that are most 
successful, and rejecting those that are not.”48 Social media may have a direct impact on 
repertoires of contention because they allow actors to “mobilize rapidly and engage in 
swarm-like challenges, taking simultaneous action on multiple fronts, and in multiple 
ways.”49 These new protest tactics have been increasingly employed in recent episodes of 
street-based contention, and include such tactics as instant gatherings public squares, 
dissemination of photographic, audio and video evidence of corruption and police 
brutality, and the emotionalizing of injustices through dedicated Facebook, Twitter and 
Youtube pages. Howard finds that social media has been “crucial for the organization of 
radical youth movements and the use of new protest tactics that undermine authoritarian 
                                                        
44 In Sidney Tarrow, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30. 
45 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 31. 
46 In Brent Rolfe, “Building an Electronic Repertoire of Contention,” Social Movement Studies 4 (May, 
2005): 67. 
47 Rolfe, “Building an Electronic Repertoire of Contention,” 67. 
48 Ibid. 




regimes.”50 Hence blogs, Twitter and Facebook may enable activists to engage in new 
forms of contentious activity not only because information regarding popular grievances 
and protest activity can now travel faster and further than ever before, but also because it 
travels across bridges of strong (friends) and weak (acquaintances) ties. This phenomena 
was exhibited during the Egyptian revolts of 2011 when networks with little in common - 
young, educated, urban elites, labor unions, and the Muslim Brotherhood - took to 
coordinating tactics and protest activity.  
 
2.2.3) Organizational Issues 
Whereas protest activity was once driven through the limited scope of diffusion of close 
acquaintances, social media may help alleviate the organizational issues that affect 
contentious activity by spreading personal networks across traditional bridges such as 
class, occupation, or geographic distance. In his work on networks and the strength of 
weak ties (acquaintances as opposed to close friends and family), Mark Granovetter 
argues that   
individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of 
the social system and will be confined to the provincial news and views of their 
close friends … such individuals may be difficult to organize or integrate into 
political movements of any kind, since membership in movements or goal-oriented 




Charlie Beckett similarly finds that “‘weak ties’ have the practical benefit of spreading 
information, of making people feel part of something. It gives them a sense of solidarity 
                                                        
50 Howard, “The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,” 155. 





and for some, the ‘permission’ to go further.”52 Hence, “by reducing communication 
costs and enabling easy linkages across diverse organizations, the Internet may facilitate 
network-building based on affinities or relatively loose identifications.”53 Today, 
Facebook and other social media are increasingly changing the density of weak ties that 
any one individual can possess, thus enlarging personal networks, and bridging gaps 
between pre-existing networks. Granovetter argues “while members of one or two cliques 
may be efficiently recruited, the problem is that, without weak ties, any momentum 
generated in this way does not spread beyond the clique.”54 The strength of social media 
with regards to contentious activity is therefore that they enable communication between 
users, who may then link with other users, allowing individuals to transmit their ideas and 
images to large numbers of acquaintances and even strangers.
55
 Writing about the Arab 
world, Khamis and Vaughan write “it is safe to say that one of the most important 
avenues through which public opinion trends and public spheres are both shaped, as well 
as reflected (…) is the Internet.”56 A recent study by Zhuo, Wellman, and Yu has 
demonstrated that whereas “strong ties convinced friends and family to join” the 
Egyptian protest movement, “the more abundant and diverse ties found on social media 
bridged communities and spread the news widely even in the face of government 
                                                        
52 Charlie Beckett, “How weak ties can lead to real revolutions,” Polis Blog, January 15, 2011. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2011/01/15/how-weak-ties-can-lead-to-real-revolutions/. 
53 W. Lance Bennett, “Communicating Global Activism: Some Strengths and Vulnerabilities of Networked 
Politics,” in Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements. Wim van de Donk, Brian D. 
Loader, Paul G. Nixon, and Dieter Rucht, eds. (London: Routledge). 
54 Granovetter, ““The Strength of Weak Ties,” 202. 
55 Facebook, Twitter and Youtube allow users to seamlessly share posts across all three platforms. For 
example, a user posting a link on Twitter to a video on Youtube, can have that link automatically appear on 
their Facebook wall for others to watch and share. One this cycle is started, posts or videos can “go viral” 
within hours as countless numbers of people can create links to that video through their Twitter and 
Facebook pages.  




manipulation of mass media and shutdown of the internet.”57 Howard’s analysis of the 
Egyptian uprising similarly concludes “it is clear that the ability to produce and consume 
political content, independent of social elites, is important because the public sense of 
shared grievances and potential for change can develop rapidly.”58  
 
2.3) OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
In 1994, Tim Kuran’s research showed that “mass discontent” does not “necessarily 
generate a popular uprising against the political status quo.”59 Instead, it is the sudden 
recognition that individual grievances are shared by many others that help to predict 
revolutions.
60
 The public assertion of opposition is seen as an opportunity for contentious 
behaviour, and a “wave of mobilization can be seen as a collective response to generally 
expanding political opportunities in which the costs and risks of collective action are 
lowered and the potential gains increase.”61 Sidney Tarrow finds that opportunities 
increase when populations are faced with situations that offend their “sense of justice” or 
impose “costs they cannot bear,” compelling them to react despite the risk of doing so.62 
In their discussion of new media in contentious politics, Aday et al. note that media 
systems are important in generating “political opportunity” due to their role in allowing 
the public to “acquire large amounts of information in real time, and to measure its 
                                                        
57 Zhuo, X., B. Wellman and J. Ju, “Egypt: The First Internet Revolt?” Peacemagazine.org. January 7, 
2011. http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v27n3p06.htm. 
58 Phillip N. Howard, “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab 
Spring?” Working Paper: Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, University of 
Washington (2011), 23. 
59 Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” 
World Politics Vol. 44, No 1 (1991) 16. 
60 Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never,” 30. 
61 Sidney Tarrow, “Aiming at a Moving Target: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern 
Europe,” PS: Political Science and Politics 24, (1991), 15. 




content rapidly and accurately.”63 Examples of acquired information occur when social 
media helps in “publicizing splits among the ruling elite, creating lines of communication 
for challengers to engage segments of the elite in new ways.”64 This information, once 
disseminated, may “change perceptions about the real distribution of opinion within a 
society, so that others feel safer coming forward in support of a previously taboo position 
once they see how many online peers share their views.”65 The latter process begins when 
information spreads across networks and creates an “information cascade” whereby 
individuals “choose actions based on what they observe others doing.”66 Literature on 
unexpected revolutions suggests that one of the major obstacles to mass protest is 
preference falsiﬁcation: “individuals who detest the regime refrain from making their 
views public out of fear of either social or official sanction.”67 According to Kuran, the 
push for revolution is concealed by those who feign sympathy for the status quo.
68
 The 
increased incidence of contentious views made available through social media may 
therefore encourage others who privately hold contentious views to express them in 
public. According to Daniel Drezner, information cascades can “trigger spontaneous acts 
of protest,” especially since “a little bit of public information can reverse a long- standing 
informational cascade that contributed to citizen quiescence.”69 Hence the simple act of 
realizing that others are experiencing the same perceptions about events, suffering the 
same injustice and violence, represents an opportunity that increases the likelihood that 
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citizens may join a revolution rather than simply watch it. Finally, according to Zeynep 
Tufecki, “the ability to ensure that their struggle and their efforts are not buried in a deep 
pit of censorship, the ability to continue to have an honest conversation, the ability to 
know that others know what one knows all combine to create a cycle furthering dissent 
and upheaval.”70 
 
2.4) RESOURCE MOBILIZATION   
Resource-mobilization theory is a rational choice theory which focuses on activist’s 
material conditions and “structural factors rather than individual psychologies”71 in 
explaining the emergence of mass protest movements. The theory considers resources 
such as money as the crucial factor in the emergence and success of social movements, 
arguing that the ability to mobilize sufficient resources is what compels individuals with 
grievances to take action. According to Craig Jenkins,  
mobilization is the process by which a group secures collective control over the 
resources needed for collective action. The major issues therefore are the resources 
controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts, the processes by which the group 




The theory lends attention to factors such as “incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or 
structures,”73 emphasizing the dependence of social movements upon external factors 
such as time, money, and organizational skills. These resources are seen as critical to the 
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choice of tactical action and hence to the success of social movements.
74
 According to 
Oliver and Myers, if “a group has resources that permit it to engage in some actions and 
not others or has enough to invest some resources in procuring more, then these resources 
directly impact on the kinds of actions a group emits.”75 The theory is therefore well 
suited to explaining the success of mass movements in an information society. As social 
media makes instantaneous communication faster and cheaper, it becomes a resource that 
may facilitate the flow of communications between activists, social media users, and the 
greater public who may be unaware that their grievances are shared by many others. In 
their analysis of resource mobilization efforts during the Egyptian uprising, Wiest and 
Eltantawy concluded that  
What these activists were doing—in terms of debating, organizing, and planning—
is not new in itself, but the means employed to communicate with each other and 
execute the revolution represents an important new resource for collective action. 
Social media introduced a novel resource that provided swiftness in receiving and 
disseminating information; helped to build and strengthen ties among activists; and 




Their analysis is in line with Della Porta and Mosca’s finding that Internet-based 
communication empowers “resource poor” actors, especially as a logistical resource 
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2.5) FRAMING PROCESSES AND IDENTITY FORMATION 
The third factor in the overall social movement framework comprises “strategic attempts 
to craft, disseminate, and contest the language and narratives used to describe a 
movement.”78 Theorists such as Alberto Melucci and Ernesto Laclau have discussed the 
importance of identity in enabling the emergence of social movements. For Melucci “the 
construction of a collective identity is one of the first tasks to be dealt with during the 
process of mobilization, alongside the identification of an enemy, the definition of a 
purpose and an object at stake in the conflict. These phases entail the progressive fusion 
of participants into a common social body.”79 Similarly, Oliver and Myers write “the 
shifting terms by which groups denote themselves are pointers to shifting political 
currents as they name and rename themselves in ongoing processes of collective identity 
construction.”80 The ability to “foster collective identity across a dispersed population” is 
therefore one of the internet’s crucial benefits because it allows activists and protest 
leaders to mobilize large and diverse segments of populations in support of targeted 
collective action.
81
 In this context, “social media have acted as a means of collective 
aggregation, facilitating the convergence of disparate individuals around common 
symbols and places, signifying their unity despite diversity.”82 Khamis and Vaughn also 
note that social networks open new “channels for expressing consciousness and national 
solidarity” because they provide “a platform for ordinary citizens the opportunity to 
document their own version of reality.”83 The ability to bypass established mass media 
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outlets in the race to shape public discourse is among the most discussed changes 
associated with social media. In the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution Nunns and 
Idle’s collected tens of thousands of Tweets emitted from within Cairo during the 
Egyptian revolt, and found that citizen-journalists produced “accurate bites of 
information and a flow of videos and pictures,” with the result being “like a company of 
artists painting a constantly updated picture of events.”84 In the absence of reliable 
coverage on state-run television and newspapers, Twitter and Facebook became an 
“alternative press mostly used as a type of by professional journalists, bloggers, and 
ordinary citizen journalists.”85 Such was there impact that many Egyptian journalists 
resigned from there posts when they understood the disconnect between the actual events 
and those depicted by the regime-backed media.
86
 Even “transnational satellite TV 
channels like Al-Jazeera,” were “influenced by information and footage coming from 
citizen journalists on the ground.”87 Philip N. Howard’s study on the use of social media 
during the Egyptian revolution concludes “citizen-journalists who do not feel their story 
is being suitably told are now doing their own digital storytelling. These patterns of 
political expression and learning are fundamental to developing democratic discourses.”88 
These patterns help frame, name and identify generalized beliefs within an oppressed 
population, and therefore constitute crucial first step for population wishing to 
collectively tackle the root cause of their grievances. 
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2.5.1) Framing Consensus and Mobilization 
Targeting grievances towards a specific enemy is an important precondition to the 
development of tactical repertoires specifically adapted to the goal being sought.
89 Paulo 
Gerbaudo argues that “the role played by identity and emotions in the process of 
mobilization, and their contribution in the symbolic construction of a sense of 
togetherness among activists, has been a highly neglected topic in social movement 
studies.”90 The sudden spread of beliefs regarding a common enemy or grievance may 
therefore help explain the rush of protest activity that engenders revolutions.  Social 
movement scholar Mario Diani emphasizes the shared identities that allow movements to 
transform from single issues to cross platform: 
the spread of a movement usually implies that a model of participation mainly based 
on single-issue instrumental coalitions with fairly narrow agendas is replaced by a 
style of collective action based on strongly felt identities. These bind people together 
in a longer time perspective and assign a shared meaning to coalitions and activities 




One explanation of social media’s role in abetting the spread of movements is Clay 
Shirky’s claim that “as a medium gets faster, it gets more emotional. We feel faster than 
we think.”92 Twitter, he adds, is a “much more personal medium. Reading personal 
messages from individuals on the ground prompts a whole other sense of involvement 
(…) Twitter makes us empathize. It makes us part of it. Even if it’s just retweeting, 
you’re aiding the goal that dissidents have always sought: the awareness that the outside 
world is paying attention is really valuable.”93 This practice was made visible during the 
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Egyptian revolution, as well as in recent events inTurkey and Ukraine, whereby social 
media was used to “direct people towards specific protest events,” and provided 
participants with “suggestions and instructions about how to act, and in the construction 
of an emotional narration to sustain their coming together in public space.”94 As has been 
observed during recent protest movements, influential Facebook administrators and 
tweets by prominent activist have “played a crucial role in setting the scene for gatherings 
in public spaces, by constructing common identifications and accumulating or triggering 
an emotional impulse towards public assembly.”95 This process is in line with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory about the “chain of equivalence.” Equivalence occurs when different 
political opinions and grievances are articulated together in opposition to another 
camp.”96 During the events in Egypt, Mubarak’s autocratic regime and the police 
apparatus designed to maintain it, became the butt of protesters’ grievances. The 
protesters’ collective grievances became symbolically articulated through one central 
claim - the removal of Mubarak from office. 
 
2.6) NETWORK THEORY 
Early theorists of digital communication focused on evaluating the relationship between 
resources and opportunity structures in networked environments. Researchers such as 
Arthur Lupia and Gisela Sin showed that weak individual commitment to political 
movements “may play out differently under conditions of drastically reduced 
communication costs,” as free-riders find it “easier to become participants in political 
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networks.”97 In The Wealth of Networks, Yovhai Benkler proposes that “self-motivation 
rather than external incentives” pushes participation in online networks.98 This process is 
called “peer production”, as it is “based on voluntary cooperation among participants 
who contribute to a mutually valued project in order to produce a public good.”99 Here 
we think of sites such as Wikipedia, and phenomena such a open-source software, which 
allow users to participate in the creation, maintenance and improvement of public goods 
with the only reward being “personal recognition for contributions to the network,” and 
the “the various goods and outcomes that result from contribution.”100 These sharing-
based networks point to different types of social organization and association, expressed 
and mediated through technology. In Bennett and Segerberg’s analysis, technology 
enables the personalization of action frames, meaning that the act of “sharing personal 
calls to action and the technologies through which they spread help explain both how 
events are communicated to external audiences and how the action itself is organized.”101 
This occurs because due to “symbolic inclusiveness” of the political content expressed 
through new media - in the form of personalized ideas and messages - and “technological 
openness” of participants who feel comfortable spreading these messages throughout 
networks of digital connections including friends, “trusted others, and beyond”.102 “In 
this interactive process of personalization and sharing”, write Bennett and Segerberg, 
“communication networks may become scaled up and stabilized through the digital 
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technologies people use to share ideas and relationships with others.”103 One of the 
important contributions of social media to this process is the instantaneous spreading of 
short personalized messages called memes “that travel easily across large and diverse 
populations” because they are “easy to imitate, adapt personally, and share broadly with 
others.”104 Examples include the “We are the 99%” meme created following the creation 
of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement in 2011. The transmission of these “personal 
expressions across networks” may help “motivate anger or compassion among a large 
number of individuals,” who may subsequently become “capable of targeted action.”105  
 
2.7) REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPACITY 
Apart from the social movements framework, collective action must also be analyzed 
through the political environment in which it occurs. The differences that separate 
political regimes from one country to the next affect contentious politics on two levels: 
governmental capacity and extent or lack of democracy.
106
 According to Tilly and 
Tarrow ‘capacity’ means  
the extent to which governmental action affects the character and distribution of 
population, activity and resources within the government’s territory. When a high-
capacity government intervenes in population, activity, and resources, it makes a big 
difference; it raises taxes, distributes benefits, regulates traffic flows, controls the use 
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The authors further note that “very different sorts of contention prevail” depending on the 
nature of the regime.
108
 High-capacity undemocratic regimes feature “both clandestine 
opposition and brief confrontations” that usually end in repression.109 These levels of 
repression and brutality are often the defining factor in people’s perception of their own 
ability to affect change through protest movements. In reference to the Middle East, 
Diani notes, “strong repressive apparatuses usually discourage civic activity in the area 
and thus the establishment of networks beyond the boundaries of milieus which are safe 
in terms of the mutual trust required from their members.”110 Eva Bellin further notes that 
the capacity of a coercive apparatus depends on the “physical wherewithal to muster the 
men and materiel necessary to repress.”111 Moreover, “if the coercive apparatus is 
patrimonially organized rather than institutionalized, it is likely to be less receptive to the 
idea of regime change because it is more likely to be ‘ruined by reform’.”112 “With its 
back against the wall of potential ruin”, writes Bellin, “the security elite is more inclined 
to repress democratic reformers.”113  
 
2.7.1) Revolutions and the Coercive Apparatus 
In Eva Bellin’s discussion of Theda Skocpol’s work on revolutions, she points out that 
“although the intuitive prerequisite for revolution - mass disaffection from the regime in 
power - is a relatively common phenomenon in human experience, successful revolution 
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is a relatively rare event.”114 The explanation that emerges from Skocpol’s work is that 
the occurrence of revolutions depends on “the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on 
the means of coercion.”115 According to Skocpol, “if the state's coercive apparatus 
remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive 
significant illegitimacy, value incoherence, and even a pervasive sense of relative 
deprivation among its subjects.”116 In short, writes Bellin, “the strength, coherence, and 
effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus distinguish among cases of successful 
revolution, revolutionary failure, and nonoccurrence.”117  
 
2.8) COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Throughout the 20
th
 century, collective action in Middle Eastern states was rooted largely 
within “communities,” “neighborhoods,” and “bazaar” gatherings, “drawing upon the 
non-explicitly political networks and solidarities they provide.”118 “The creation and 
maintenance of coalitions” was restricted due to “weak civil society with weak voluntary 
associations,” and “forms of resistance [that] that do not necessarily overlap with the 
political.”119 Nonetheless, many “Muslim-majority/Arab countries” have gradually 
experienced the growth of political movements, “from trade union movements, 
nationalist and leftist ones, to Islamic/fundamentalist movements.”120 The existence of 
these groups poses the challenge of understanding why wide-scale protest had not 
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occurred before 2010. In her analysis of Middle Eastern and North African countries, Eva 
Bellin writes “it is not as though the region has been deprived of all democratic impulses. 
It has indeed experienced the fledgling emergence of civil society (human rights groups, 
professional associations, self-help groups), only to see most of them either repressed or 
corporatized by the state.”121 The brutality of the coercive apparatus in many middle 
eastern states is seen as the main impediment to mass protest because “most people, aside 
from die-hard activists, are reluctant to participate in protests if they think it likely that 
they will get hurt or killed in the process of participating.”122 However analyses of the 
Egyptian revolution of 2011 have pointed to a change in this cost-benefit analysis, thanks 
in part to the spread of internet. In their analysis, Khamis and Vaughn quote a phone 
interview with Adel Iskander, Adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s Center for 
Contemporary Arabic Studies, who found that during the Egyptian revolution of 2011, 
“Facebook amplified, magnified and expedited the process of revolt, through providing 
unique networking opportunities. The strategic use of new media helped the revolution to 
snowball, through using certain strategies, maneuvers and tactics that turned small 
protests into a huge challenge to the regime that led to its ultimate demise.”123 Whether 
these new trends in collective action are dependent upon social media is the central 
question in this paper, one I will seek to answer through the selection of cases where vast 
protest movements emerged after years of relative quiescence. 
 
 
3) RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
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There are currently no established causal mechanisms through which to explain the 
relationship between social media use and mass mobilization in favor of reform under 
authoritarian regimes. Hence the theory being developed will be an inductive one based 
on the phenomena observed over the course of case studies that fit criteria for inferring 
theories. Van Evera writes that “to make a new theory we select cases where the 
phenomenon we seek to explain is abundant but its known causes are scarce or 
absent.”124 My research will seek to uncover the effects of social media on contentious 
politics, and to infer a theory about the mechanisms that lead social media to become 
effective tools for fomenting, mobilizing, and organizing mass protest movements. I will 
follow the lead set by scholars such as Henry Farrell and Eva Bellin who suggest 
forgoing mono-causal relationships in favor of complex causal mechanisms “that might 
intervene between forms of communication such as the Internet and final political 
outcomes.”125 In her recent analysis of events in the Middle East Eva Bellin points out 
that the “variable incidence of social mobilization in the region remains significantly 
under theorized, at least in the sense of developing parsimonious and generalizable 
hypotheses that account for the variation observed.”126 Recent quantitative studies have 
concluded that the “question is not whether this or that type of media plays a major role 
but how that role varies over time and circumstance.”127 I will therefore analyze recent 
protest movement in Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Ukraine, with the aim of developing a 
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theory concerning the role of social media in contentious politics and mass mobilization.  
To do so, I will process-trace and compare the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, the Iranian 
revolution of 2009, and the recent upheavals in Turkey and Ukraine in 2013/2014. The 
appearance of contentious political activity under regimes with different degrees of 
authoritarian tendency, coercive capacity, military loyalty, and public access to 
information will allow me to trace the sequence of events before and during episodes of 
upheaval in search of causal mechanisms that may allow me to compare the cases and 
infer a theory about the role of politically contentious social media use in fomenting mass 
protests. In each case, mass protests reached the highest numbers of protesters and protest 
sites observed in past decades, offering citizens unprecedented opportunities to engage in 
revolutionary activity. The abundance of available first person accounts, backed up by 
primary sources, journalistic reports, qualitative research make the cases of Egypt, Iran, 
Ukraine and Turkey, good starting points for my research. Although the cases have vastly 
different background condition, there are key similarities between the Egyptian, Iranian, 
and Turkish and Ukrainian examples – such as the swiftness of protest development, and 
the defiance of hundreds of thousands of protesters who took to public spaces to share 
their grievances in defiance of established authority – which makes these cases well 
suited for process-tracing analysis. 
 
3.2) PROCESS-TRACING 
In order estimate the causal effects of ‘politically contentious social media use’ on the 
occurrence of mass protest movements, I will employ the process tracing method to 




variable.”128 Causal mechanisms are here defined as “the causal processes and 
intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal 
effects.”129 I will seek to provide a detailed account of how specific use of social media 
led to episodes of mass protest, “observing the apparent causal mechanisms and heuristic 
rendering of these mechanisms” in order to infer a hypotheses for future testing.130 In 
their book Contentious Politics Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly write, 
“to explain contentious politics is to identify its recurrent causal mechanisms, the ways 
they combine, in what sequences they recur, and why different combinations and 
sequences…produce varying effects on the large scale.”131 The authors describe the 
process-tracing methods as “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and 
the outcome of the dependent variable.”132 I have therefore selected 4 cases which meet 
Van Evera’s case-selection criteria: (1) “data richness”, (2) “extreme values on the 
dependent variable,” (3) “large within-case variance in values on the dependent variable,” 
(4) “divergence of the predictions made of the case by competing theories, “(5) “the 
resemblance of case background conditions to the conditions of current policy problems,” 
(6) “prototypicality of the case background conditions” (in that each individual case 
resembles a prototype of authoritarianism and popular grievances which may be found in 
other countries), (7) “appropriateness for comparison with other cases” (the cases will be 
compared, however they do meet the stringent requirements of the controlled 
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comparison), (8) “outlier character,” and (9) “intrinsic importance.”133 Following Van 
Evera’s methods, my starting point for case selection was the presence of “associations 
between phenomena and testimony by people who directly experienced the case.”134 
Whereas the final political outcomes were different across each case, they all share the 
occurrence of unprecedented protest waves that forced regimes to react either through 
violent repression, negotiation or resignation. By observing each case, the background 
under which politically contentious activity occurred, the specific use of social media, the 
opportunities it may have created, and how activists responded, I will seek to uncover the 
process that led to episodes of mass protest and thereby infer a theory about social 
media’s role in inspiring protesters to take to the streets, defy repression and brutality, 
and act in unison in favor of a common goal. 
 
3.3) CASE STUDY SELECTION 
I am choosing four different cases for process-tracing analysis, in hope that similarities 
will be revealed which may allow us to infer a generalizable theory. I will analyze 
politically contentious social media use preceding major protest movements in the case of 
Egypt’s 2011 revolution, Iran’s 2009 post-election protests, Turkey’s 2013 Gezi Park 
movement and Ukraine’s 2013 EuroMaidan movement. The regimes under which the 
mass protest occurred are all on different scales of the capacity-democracy model 
developed by Charles Tilly, and will thus allow me to compare cases where popular 
dissatisfaction under different types of authoritarian regimes led to similar levels of mass 
mobilization. While I will mention levels of Internet penetration in each case, these 
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measures are not wholly relevant to my research as Bruce Etling and Robert Faring have 
found that “even in countries with low internet penetration rates, bloggers and online 
media serve as the major source of information to radio and other mainstream media, 
which then reach a wider audience.”135 This phenomenon occurred in the cases of Egypt, 
Iran and Turkey, where bloggers and social media “serve as a source of ideas, discussion, 
and commentary not found in the traditional media.”136 Moreover, as mainstream media 
outlets become increasingly reliant on social media for up-to-the-minute information 
during episodes of mass mobilization, the actual levels of use and penetration become 
less relevant than the ways in which social media networks are used. In order to infer a 
theory, I will look mainly at the actual substance of events, how they occurred, the time 
frames and methods used by protesters to achieve their goals. The four cases will 
therefore allow me to analyze the outcome of new tactics and repertoires made possible 
by social media, and to establish a theory that may be tested in order to expand our 
current understanding of contentious politics in an increasingly networked environment.  
 
3.4) VARIABLES 
I define politically contentious social media use as the creation and dissemination of 
content challenging the established political order, and seeking to elicit coordinated 
protest activity against a regime. More specifically, I will analyze how social media is 
used to trigger conversations surrounding emotionally salient issues such as vote rigging, 
police brutality and corruption, and how these conversations may foment episodes of 
mass protest. I will seek to uncover the causal mechanisms that lead politically 
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contentious social media use to motivate and convince individuals to join protest 
movement despite the possibility of harsh reprisal by authoritarian regimes. Four cases – 
all with different backgrounds characteristic – will serve as case studies where such use 
of social media occurred. It is primarily the content of politically contentious 
communication between activists, opposition movements and protesters, which will 
comprise the key indicators of my study variable. The extensive body of scholarly work 
reviewed in the literature review reveals a number of other variables that must be 
considered in any analysis of social movements attempting to dislodge authoritarian 
governments. Common grievances across class lines, emotional triggers, mobilizing 
opportunities, cost/benefit analyses favorable to protesters when considering the risk 
associated with challenging the regime, and finally the willingness of the coercive 
apparatus to respond with brutal force; these variables will all be considered as I conduct 
a process-tracing analysis of events. Comparing the four cases will also allow me to 
analyze the impact of as satellite television, which may also be used to foment protest by 
informing audiences about regime abuses and protest locations. The process-tracing 
method will serve to identify the causal mechanisms that led longstanding grievances to 
suddenly become crystallized into episodes of mass public protests. My dependent 
variable, mass public protests, is defined as spontaneous gatherings of tens of thousands 
of protesters willing to publicly defy a regime despite the risk of brutal repression. 
 
3.5) EGYPT 2011 
I am selecting Egypt’s 2011 revolution as my principal case study with an eye on 




Van Evera describes it. In order to develop a new theory about the impact of political 
social networking on contentious politics and mass mobilization, I will start with a 
thorough analysis of the Egyptian revolution, tracing the process of contentious politics 
starting in 2005 (when protesters first made use of information technology), until the 
deposition of Hosni Mubarak on early 2011. I am selecting Egypt as my central case 
study because it is a unique outlier case in that it represents the first major protest 
movement in history which claims to have achieved its goal thanks in part to social media 
sites. Moreover the speed with which the protesters toppled Mubarak’s regime of 30 
years make it one of the most successful protests movements in recent history. Egypt also 
satisfies the criteria of having extreme values on the study variable and large within-case 
variance in values on study variable, both of which are desirable when inferring theories. 
Many recent publications reveal the details of political social networking in the lead-up to 
and during the events of January 2011, exploring the minutiae of protest activity on blogs 
and social media. Egypt is a strong case study for the purposes of this research due to the 
richness of data available regarding events on the ground in January and February 2011. 
The process of social upheaval was well documented through journalistic reports, and has 
been supplemented by secondary sources published since 2012 providing thorough 
analysis of the specific events and digital interactions that led hundreds of thousands of 
protesters to descend upon Tahrir Square in January 2011. Abundant testimony has been 
collected from people who directly experienced the revolution, most notably referenced 
in Philip N. Howard’s and Zeynep Tufekci’s research on social networks in the run-up to 
the ousting of Mubarak. Paulo Gerbaudo’s Tweets from The Streets also analyses the 






 movement in 2008 through the 18-day standoff in 2011.
137
 These texts will help reveal 
the details of political exchanges as they occurred on social media preceding each major 
protest event. Egypt also fulfills the criteria of resembling other current situations of 
policy concern, in that the Middle East is still rife with repressive regimes clinging to 
power despite the growth of vocal and determined protest movements (e.g.: Iran, Syria). 
Regarding the generalizability of the Egyptian example, pre-2011 Egypt can be said to 
have similar background conditions to other countries of the region, mainly because 
Mubarak’s regime shared features with other high-capacity undemocratic regimes of the 
Middle East. The weakness of the Egypt case is that in 2010, social media use was still 
restricted to the urban, mostly educated elite, which brings into question the root causes 
of the revolution and whether it was truly a bottom-up discussion.  Moreover, satellite 
television had much greater penetration throughout the country and the case can be made 
that this was the catalyst that drove the masses to support the revolution. In order to better 
understand social media’s contribution, I will conduct a process-tracing analysis of the 
Egyptian case, with an eye to comparing the events in Cairo to those in Tehran’s 2009 
uprising, as well as to uprisings in Istanbul and Kiev in 2013.  
 
4) EGYPT CASE STUDY 
4.1) BACKGROUND CONDITIONS 
State of Emergency 
                                                        
137 In “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?” lead 
researcher Philip N. Howard and his team at the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam 
analyzed tens of thousands of blog entries, twitter data entries and viral videos on Youtube, and analyzed 




Before the integration of Internet into Egyptian society, a 30 year-old state of emergency 
law had allowed the Mubarak regime to muffle free speech and protest movements 
through police crackdowns, a network of informants, and secret information services. 
These policies dated back to Gamal Nasser’s Free Officers’ Revolt of 1952, when the 
regime “nationalized the press, the cinema and most publishing houses, establishing what 
one historian has termed ‘a virtual state monopoly on culture.’”138 Under Mubarak’s 
regime, the “sociopolitical and economic climate was both stifling and depressing; 
presidential and parliamentary elections lacked transparency, corruption permeated all 
government bodies, and political conditions for Egyptian citizens were oppressive, 
preventing free expression, protest opportunities, and general political participation.”139 
Freedom of association and assembly were severely curtailed, and the regime considered 
a public gathering of five people or more without a permit as an illegal event subject to 
arrest.
140
 Mubarak’s “secret police, the notorious ‘mukhabarat’ … acted as a powerful 
deterrent for those harboring aversion towards the regime.”141 Gerbaudo notes “the use of 
torture, violence, kidnappings and sometime arbitrary killings of political opponents was 
common knowledge among the population,” spawning a state of paranoia among 
segments of the population with contentious political opinions.
142
 According to Sohair 
Wastamy “when opposition leaders were occasionally brave enough to hand sensitive 
documents to the media, it often resulted in the journalists getting thrown in prison and 
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the newspapers shutting down.”143 Such coercive measures made Egyptians reticent to 
take to the streets and kept large public protests at bay for the majority of Mubarak’s rule. 
 
Kefaya and the Emergence of Public protest 
Succumbing to pressure by the Bush administration, the Mubarak regime planned to hold 
its first multiparty election in the fall 2005. A movement named ‘Kefaya’ (Enough) 
emerged as a reaction to President Mubarak’s planned amendment to the Egyptian 
constitution, which would allow him to run for an “unprecedented fifth six-year term” 
and the “possible succession of his son Gamal.”144 Kefaya brought together intellectuals, 
“radicals and moderates from various ideological currents,” uniting around the goal of 
political change, including the protection of civil liberties, intellectual development, 
economic growth, and the reduction of high levels of poverty and corruption.
145
 Initially, 
Kefaya was comprised of “300 intellectuals and public figures from very different 
backgrounds” who “issued a founding document that declare[s] their opposition to the 
regime and demands a real change in Egypt that purges the system of economic and 
political oppression.”146 The majority of Kefaya’s early members were university 
students and young professionals, mostly “well educated, unmarried men in their early 
20s with family backgrounds in the urbanized middle-classes.”147 In April 2005 Kefaya 
                                                        
143 Sohair Wastamy, “Egyptians Find Their Power in Access to Information.” American Libraries 
Magazine, Feb 16, 2011. http://www.americanlibrariesmagazine.org/article/egyptians-find-their-power-
access-information. 
144 Nadia Oweidat et al. The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative. (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 2008), viii. 
145 Oweidat et al. The Kefaya Movement,14. 
146 Maher Hamoud, “Editor’s letter: Egyptians between the two Gamals (3 of 5): A nation on the back 
burner”. Daily News Egypt, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/10/31/editors-letter-egyptians-between-
the-two-gamals-3-of-5-a-nation-on-the-back-burner/. 
147 Henry Onodera, “The Kifaya Generation Politics Of Change Amonc Youth In Egypt,” Suomen 




began organizing peaceful through its website, asking for “new constitution, drafted by a 
constituent and freely elected assembly”, “the freedom to form political parties and 
publish papers,” and a “clean hands campaign.”148 Using a strategy started during the 
anti-Iraq war demonstrations in 2003, organizers drew 2,000 persons to a June 2005 
demonstration in Cairo by sending text messages to thousands of mobile phones, helping 
draw “the most organized and impressive demonstration by the reform movement to 
date.”149 According to research conducted by the Rand National Defense Research 
Institute “Kefaya also advertised events in its online calendar, sent text messages to as 
many mobile phones as possible, emailed original members regularly, and called for 
support from bloggers.”150 Kefaya’s adoption of blogs as a means to mobilize support for 
political causes indicates the expansion of repertoires of contention available to 
Egyptians at that time. Blogs provided a strategic platform through which to advertize 
messages that were likely to be censored in newspapers or on television. One such 
example occurred when “Kefaya was able to advertise a September 2007 rally in support 
of freedom of the press on the Wehda Masrya [Egyptian Unity] blog, but saw all copies 
of the independent newspaper Al-Karama confiscated when it advertised an anti-Mubarak 
rally.
151
 Journalist and deputy editor of The Daily Star Egypt, Ramia Al Malky writes “ 
If Kifaya has provided the political space for voices of opposition to speak out, blogs 
have provided the means for Kifaya’s mobilization. Not only have bloggers continued 
to challenge the official version of events, exposing a wide array of abuses by Egypt’s 
authorities and monitoring fellow activists’ lives in jail, they have also rallied other 
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Following a string of small protests, violent repression soon followed and Kefaya 
activists began encountering an overwhelming number of security agents. Attacks on 
protestors by “security officers and soldiers dressed in civilian clothes became routine at 
Kefaya demonstrations,” and many activists “were beaten and detained without charges 
or trials.”153 In the aftermath of these protests, bloggers began documenting physical and 
sexual abuse committed by state police, as well as posting videos on Youtube of 
uniformed officers torturing and mocking prisoners. Despite its deft use of electronic 
media, the movement failed to garner mass appeal within Egypt. On the day of the 
referendum on constitutional reform, voter turnout was low and Kefaya’s tactics would 
ultimately prove unable to mobilize more than a few thousand protestors to denounce the 
political abuses of the Egyptian state. Moreover scores of protesters were beaten, arrested 
and detained without trial, and Mubarak’s party kept complete control of the 
parliament.
154
 One explanation is that “the more prevalent state-controlled media 
managed to overwhelm Kefaya’s message […] leading Egyptian newspapers insinuated 
that Kefaya’s leaders were traitors who were carrying out orders from the U.S. 
government to undermine the stability of the country.”155 In addition, Henry Farrell 
points out that “the identity of protesters is key—protesters who appear to be more 
representative of the general population provide more convincing signals of the privately 
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held preferences of the majority than unrepresentative ones.”156 Composed mostly of 
intellectuals, left-leaning politicians and middle class youth, Kefaya lacked broad-based 
appeal, and was easily marginalized by the regime. A Guardian article dated April 7
th
 
2008 notes that “despite some noteworthy achievements,” Kefaya remained a largely 
“visionary elitist movement seemingly incapable of rallying significant support on the 
ground.”157 The fact that Kefaya represented only a small segment of the Egyptian public 
may be a crucial point in explaining the government’s victory over the Kefaya 
movement. Six years later, when tens of thousands took to the streets - including laborers, 
Muslim brothers, students and intellectuals - the Mubarak government was “at pains to 
claim that the demonstrators constituted an unrepresentative minority and that the 
demonstrations were being fomented by outsiders.”158 The reasons for this dramatic 
increase in protesters willing to risk their lives to defy the regime are the central focus of 
this process-tracing analysis. As I follow the course of events leading to the January 2011 
protests, I will point to causal mechanisms that may explain the shift in Egyptians’ 
outlook.  
Kefaya’s Importance 
Despite its shortfalls, the Kefaya movement was among the first to display the regime’s 
unpopularity with a segment of the population, which “in turn suggested to observers that 
the Mubarak regime, even if it still had power, lacked popular support.”159 While 
Kefaya’s attempts to mobilize large gatherings had failed, it had nonetheless succeeded in 
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harnessing the power of the internet to bridge traditional divides within Egyptian politics. 
Both through blogs and through the shared experience of violent interrogation and 
prolonged detention, solidarity between rival political streams may have commenced 
under the Kefaya banner. Henri Onodera argues that “detentions in shared cells” may 
have “fostered new ties of friendship and solidarity between, for instance, secular-leftist 
activists and Muslim Brothers,”160 while journalist Rania Al-Malky’s suggests that 
“threading stories of individual experience into a shared narrative of community 
experience is undoubtedly one of the potentials of blogs.”161 Shared experience is 
arguably the most crucial element in the development of a pluralized protest movement, 
and analysis of developments in 2010-2011 will show that Kefaya’s early display of 
audacity and bravery in organizing bold action against the regime was the spark which 
led to the organizing of subsequent protest movements, both online and in the streets of 
Egypt’s major cities. 
 
Labor Protests and Creation of April 6 Movement 
Parallel to the Kefaya movement, labor activism in Egypt launched numerous protests 
starting in 2004 as poverty levels became exacerbated by stagnant wages, and the 
government renewed the drive to privatize public-sector factories.
162
 The movement 
created to defend workers’ rights “had gained significant concessions from the 
government since the first strikes in the textile sector in Mahalla al-Kubra in 2004, and 
had since gathered momentum and progressively extended its reach towards other 
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manufacturing sectors.”163 One such example occurred in “December 2006, when 
workers at the giant textile factorie” in the Nile Delta city of Mahalla al-Kobra “protested 
against the government’s failure to pay end of year bonuses, and called for the 
dismantling of the ETUF” (Egyptian Trade Union Federation), leading the government to 
rapidly restore the bonuses.
164
 The fact that the government gave in to the workers' 
demands set a new precedent across the country. While 2006 saw 222 such strikes, 
walkouts and protests, 2007 and 2008 saw over 700 per year.
165
 As the 2008 economic 
crisis deteriorated Egypt’s fragile economy “the situation would be exacerbated by an 
unprecedented food crisis that led to riots and bloodshed at the bread queues caused in 
part by the worldwide hike in grain prices.”166 Following decades of providing subsidized 
bread for its poorest citizens “as a component of its economic policy because it enabled 
millions to survive on low salaries,”167 in 2008 Egypt’s “bread lines lengthened” and the 
“costs of non-subsidized staples soared,” encouraging many low income workers to take 
the streets. A national day of strikes was planned for April 6, 2008, led largely by 
workers from the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla Al-Kobra, who 
intended to demand an increase in monthly minimum wages.
168
 The plight of the workers 
inspired a 27-year old human resources coordinator named Esraa Abdel Fattah created 
Facebook group dedicated to the expression solidarity with the striking workers. The 
group quickly grew as membership “exploded to over 70,000 in a few weeks, or almost 
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10% of all Egyptians on Facebook at the time.”169 Esraa teamed up with a civil engineer 
and Kefaya member named Ahmed Maher, who helped manage the Facebook page and 
would eventually become the leader of the blossoming April 6 movement. Composed 
mostly of young middle-class Cairenes and Alexandrians, the April 6 group was “initially 
amorphous and lacking a clear mission”, yet it “blossomed within days into something 
influential enough to arouse the ire of Egypt's internal security forces.”170 On March 23, 
2008, 300 invitations were sent out urging people to join and by the next morning “3,000 
people had signed up. Invitees weren't just joining — they were recruiting everyone they 
knew.”171 By late March 2008, only a few weeks after its creation, the Facebook page 
was nearing 40,000 members. A Wired Magazine profile describes the birth of the April 6 
movement: 
Participants began changing their profile pictures to the April 6 logo, which meant the 
logo kept popping up in the News Feed of anyone on Facebook who was connected to 
someone in the April 6 group. Adding to this barrage, the activists kept loading a link 
to the group into their Status Update fields, further flooding Egypt's Facebook 
universe with connections to the group and its message […] The group's message was 
inclusive and earnest, factors that proved essential for amplifying interest and 




The fact that cyber activists transformed a localized labor dispute into a call for a national 
strike is an important development in explaining the role social media can play in 
fomenting mass mobilization. The activists essentially turned the laborers grievances into 
“a harsh critique of the broader social and political situation of the country,”173 which a 
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broad cross-section the Egyptian public could identify with. On April 6, 2008, 24,000 
thousand protesters took to the streets in Mahalla, but were met by the state’s security 
forces “who obliged the labor leaders to demobilize the workers and even cancel their 
strike call. Leaders who did not concede were arrested.”174 In Cairo, the protest in support 
of the workers was violently suppressed by security forces, resulting in four deaths, and 
400 arrests, including Ahmed Maher, the group’s founder. The fact that the Cairo event 
was successfully aborted by the regime led to the perception that the group had failed due 
to a lack of coordination on the part of the organizers. However the April 6 movement 
created in 2008 served to expand Egyptians’ repertoire of contention through the 
introduction digitally mediated contention. Aware that newspapers were “monitored by 
the Ministry of Information,” young Egyptians took to using Facebook, which proved 
“irresistible as a platform for social interaction and dissent.”175 This marked a major leap 
in Egyptians’ ability to organize and mobilize in defense of a common cause.  It 
improved upon Kefaya’s tactics in that it included a segment of the population crucial to 
launching popular revolutions: the labor force. Middle-class activists now understood 
how the diverse ties found on social media could be used to bridge communities and 
“spread the news widely even in the face of government manipulation of mass media.”176 
A 2009 New York Times article notes,  
the fact that tens of thousands of disaffected young Egyptians unhappy with their 
government meet online to debate and plan events is remarkable, given the context of 
political repression in which it is occurring […] The movement has provided a 
structure for a new generation of Egyptians, who aren’t part of the nation’s small 
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coterie of activists and opinion-makers, to assemble virtually and communicate freely 
about their grievances.  
 
The April 6 strike was therefore a groundbreaking event because it had its roots offline 
“among a cohesive, organized group of laborers,” whose protest “was then vastly 
amplified by the Facebook activists.”177 The expansion of a pre-existing protest 
movement through the creation of virtual group on Facebook is particularly significant as 
it exemplifies the type of collaborations that would become necessary to the development 
of future protest movements. 
Growth of Facebook and Internet Penetration  
According to Zeynep Tufekci, “one of the most important events in the transformation of 
the Egyptian public sphere was the diffusion of Facebook, particularly its Arabic 
language service, which began in March 2009.”178 Facebook was then “the third-most 
visited Web site in Egypt, after Google and Yahoo” with close to 1 million people using 
the site, “about 11 percent of the total online population.179 According to the Arab Social 
Media Report, compiled by the Dubai School of Government, in January 2011 24.26% of 
Egyptians had Internet access, (the figure is likely understated given Egyptian’s use of 
Internet cafes at that time), with a total Facebook penetration of 5.49%, and no evidence 
whatsoever of Internet filtering.
180
 Access to Facebook was facilitated by the fact that the 
information and communication technologies sector had grown rapidly in Egypt, raising 
Internet penetration “from 9 per cent to 24 of per cent of households” between 2005 and 
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 In addition, Tufekci believes that” a new system of political communication was 
created by the dramatic increase in citizen connectivity made possible by the explosion of 
steadily less expensive cellphones with video, photo, and Internet capability,” whose 
Egypt-wide penetration would reach 80% in 2010.
182
 Cellphone penetration rates are 
relevant in this case because the revolution occurred at time when cellphones were 
increasingly capable of accessing the internet, allowing users to load Facebook and 
Twitter directly from their phones. According to Paulo Gerbaudo, the rapid growth of 
information and communication technologies in Egypt stems from the fact that the 
regime “could not effectively censor the internet without unleashing an avalanche of 
disapproval from its Western allies,” therefore presenting “the relative degree of online 
freedom enjoyed by Egyptians as proof of its agenda of political liberalization.”183 
However, the internet would also allow for the birth and dissemination of new opinions, 




4.2) THE REVOLUTION 
The Expansion of Online Dissent 
In June 2010, a young man named Khalid Sa‘id, from the city of Alexandria in northern 
Egypt was dragged out of an Internet café and “beaten to death by plainclothes police 
officers in broad daylight, reportedly as revenge for his posting of a video on YouTube 
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that showed the officers splitting up the proceeds of a drug bust.”184 According to Mona 
El-Ghobashy, “Sa‘id’s death galvanized public opinion in disgust at police predation,”185 
with images of his badly beaten face circulating on the internet, awakening many to the 
brutal reality of Mubarak’s regime. The digital networking and activism opportunities 
which arose online following the death of Khalid Sa’id would come to open the flood 
gates for other bloggers and dissidents to join the movement. One particularly incensed 
Egyptian expat called Wael Ghonim - a young Google marketing director living in Dubai 
-  soon started a Facebook group called ‘We Are All Khalid Sa‘id’. This page became the 
“focal point around which 470,000 ‘fans’ organized their dissidence while a YouTube 
video about his murder was viewed by more than 500,000 people fueling further public 
outrage.”186 Paulo Gerbaudo’s interviews with students from Cairo Nile University 
confirms the impact of the ‘Khalid Sa’id page, with many students describing it as a form 
of “political initiation,” claiming “that page got me into politics.”187 During a talk given 
on the popular public lecture tour know as “Ted Talks”, Wael Ghonim recounts the 
events following the death of the Egyptian blogger at the hands of the police:  
In a few days, tens of thousands of people there -- angry Egyptians who were 
asking the ministry of interior affairs, ‘Enough. Get those who killed this guy 
to just bring them to justice.’ But of course, they don't listen. It was an 
amazing story -- how everyone started feeling the ownership. Everyone was 
an owner in this page. People started contributing ideas (…) it connected 
people from the virtual world, bringing them to the real world, sharing the 
same dream, the same frustration, the same anger, the same desire for 
freedom…People were taking shots and photos; people were reporting 
violations of Human Rights in Egypt; people were suggesting ideas, they 
were actually voting on ideas, and then they were executing the ideas; people 
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were creating videos. Everything was done by the people to the people, and 




The Khalid Sa’id Facebook page is an example of the phenomena which Paulo Gerbaudo 
calls “emotional condensation” whereby websites, blogs or Facebook pages became 
“rallying points” for those seeking to express their “anger at the regime.”189 According to 
Gerbaudo, The Khalid Sa’id Facebook page led many youths to not only feel compassion 
for Khaled Sa’id but also identify with him, which helped organizers condense individual 
grievances through an “emotional conduit” that “transformed them into political passions 
driving the process of mobilization.”190 On the first day of the page’s creation, 36,000 
users joined the group, “helping it to quickly become the most popular anti-regime 
Facebook page.”191 Gerbaudo attributes the popularity not only to Wael Ghonim’s 
marketing skills, but also to his “ability to construct a compelling emotional conversation 
with the page’s users.”192 He employed common Egyptian dialect rather than standard 
Arabic and included “abundant visual materials, videos, pictures and the like capable of 
attracting people of low literacy skills.”193 Ghonim took on the first person persona of the 
late Khalid Said and began answering user comments “as if he were himself Khalid 
speaking from the tomb,”194 catalyzing a process of “emotional identification on the part 
of young middle-class Egyptians with someone with who they had much to share.”195 In 
Ghonim’s own words 
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The first phase was to convince people to join the page and read its posts. The second 
was to convince them to start interacting with the content by ‘liking’ and 
‘commenting’ on it. The third was to get them to participate in the page’s online 
campaign and to contribute to its content themselves. The fourth and final phase 





The fact that Facebook became a breeding ground of opposition to the regime “was for 
many politically inexperienced young people proof of the fact that Mubarak’s regime was 
less powerful than it pretended to be,” with one student commenting “the first time I 
watched the Khaled Sa’id page I got a bit scared. But then I saw that they didn’t arrest the 
admin. And I realized that there was some safety and that we could write whatever we 
wanted to.”197 This reveals that the Facebook page effectively created an impetus for 
protest spurred not only by personification of Khalid Sa’id, but also by the 
personalization of the contentious messages, which led thousands to engage with the page 
and created a sense of safety-in-numbers as hundreds of thousands of participants took to 
the online forum. The example is a strong indication that when Egyptians realized that a 
great number of their fellow citizens shared their dislike of the regime, this generated an 
information cascade that led to the regime’s rapid demise. 
 
The Final Straw 
In the wake of the self-immolation and death of a disenfranchised Tunisian fruit vendor 
named Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010, dissidents across the Muslim world 
recounted the event on Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, inspiring others to “organize 
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protests, criticize their governments, and spread ideas about democracy.
198
 Momentum 
grew for a demonstration to be held on the official holiday known as ‘Police Day,’ which 
was held every year on January 25
th
. With only a few days notice, people used Facebook, 
Twitter “and old-fashioned interpersonal or landline communication to spread calls for 
mass rallies” on Friday January 25, which would be referred to as the “day or rage.”199 
Dr. Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science at the University of Richmond was in 
Cairo as the protests broke out. In her analysis of the events she writes, “the momentum 
of 25 January exceeded organizers dreams … after tens of thousands marched toward 
Tahrir Square that Tuesday, defying the Interior Ministry’s riot police, thousands 
returned on Wednesday and Thursday; hundreds never left Tahrir.”200 Realizing that 
much of the organizing and dissemination was occurring online, “the Egyptian 
government shut off the Internet and mobile phone services for the entire country,” on 
January 28, 2011, “resulting in a blackout that lasted almost one week.”201 The move 
backfired as “students and civil society leaders stayed connected by organizing satellite 
phones and dialup connections.”202 This event is particularly telling because it reveals 
that both the regime and the protesters understood that the success of the revolution 
ultimately lay on the ability to organize and disseminate information online and via social 
media. The shutdown failed in part because it “enraged” those who had grown 
“accustomed to Internet and mobile phone access … so much so that when this access 
was revoked [when the regime turned off the Internet during protests] they ended up 
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flooding the streets.”203 According to Khamis and Vaughan, “in the absence of the 
Internet, people were afraid there would be a massacre, and so they took to the streets in 
large numbers to protect each other. And when young activists were not able to find their 
friends and counterparts on Facebook, they took to Tahrir Square to meet them there.”204 
From this point on, those who had access to Twitter and Facebook via mobile phones 
continued disseminating protest tactics and live tweeting information to their networks. 
Twitter proved particularly useful as a tool for “citizen journalism and mobilization,” 
allowing users to tell their own versions of events on the ground while sending out 
personalized messages urging their networks to join in on the protest action.
205
 Zhuo et al. 
compiled a number of tweets posted during the first episodes major episodes of upheaval. 
They cite tweets by ‘Yara Adel El Siwi,’ who on January 26, 2011 tweeted “You who 
have Twitter and Facebook workin on ur phone, use ‘em to spread words of hope. We 
won’t let this end here #jan25 was just the start.’”206 Idle and Nunns report “protesters 
marched through the back streets in districts like Shubra and Boulaq, gathering people as 
they went, all the while tweeting news of their location and progress.”207 Moreover “on 
Twitter, images were posted showing satellite maps marked with arrows indicating where 
protesters could go to avoid pro-government thugs.”208 During those turbulent days, 
Zeynep Tufekci’s team conducted a survey of approximately 1200 protesters “who had 
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participated in the Tahrir demonstrations as early as January 25.”209 Despite the chaos 
under which the interviews were conducted, the team believes “that the sample was 
similar in demographic terms to those they had witnessed demonstrating at Tahrir 
Square,” and that the dataset “may be among the largest samples of protestor surveys” 
conducted during the most chaotic days of the revolution.
210
 The team’s findings, arrived 
at “through a series of logistic regressions (…) demonstrate that participation in protests, 
both before and on the first day of the Tahrir Square demonstrations, was associated with 
particular patterns of media use.”211 They write 
Attending protests prior to the January uprising was associated with using print media, 
blogs, Facebook, and Twitter as general sources of information and, more specifically, 
with using print media and text messaging for information about protests. Participation 
in the first day of the Tahrir Square demonstrations, however, was linked to a broader 
and more varied pattern of media use. Those in attendance on January 25 reported 
using print media for general information, but not for communicating about the 
protests. Using satellite television as a general information source was associated with 
a lower likelihood of attending the first day of the protests, perhaps because other 
means of communication, such as social media, provided superior access to 
communication about the protests. Instead, those who used blogs and Twitter for both 
general information and for communicating about the protests were more likely to 
attend on the first day, as were those who used the telephone, E-mail, and Facebook to 




Philip Howard arrived at similar conclusions regarding social media’s role through 
analysis of the content of discussions occurring on social media, rather than direct 
interviews with protesters. Howard’s team analyzed over “3 million tweets, gigabytes of 
YouTube content and thousands of blog posts,”213 concluding that “a spike in online 
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revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground,”214 and that 
“social media played a central role in shaping political debates.”215 In an interview given 
to the University of Washington, lead researcher Philip Howard notes “our evidence 
suggests that social media carried a cascade of messages about freedom and democracy 
across North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise expectations for the success of 
political uprising.”216 
 
The Coercive Apparatus and Impunity 
While the swelling of the crowd in Tahrir Square was made possible by a combination of 
variables including social media, widespread grievances and crosscutting participation 
across the class and political spectrum, it is ultimately the fact that the Egyptian military 
refrained from attacking the protesters which allowed the protests to last and grow. While 
the police did at first launch violent attacks against the crowds in Tahrir, it was the 
military that ultimately decided whether the protesters would be shot and killed “en 
masse”, or whether the chaos would be tolerated. Eva Bellin raises an important point 
about the high level of institutionalization of Egypt’s military, entailing that it may have 
had more to lose in massacring civilians than in regime change. According to Bellin, 
patrimonial military is more likely to massacre civilians because it risks “ruin by 
reform,”217 whereas a “lethal attack on civilians threatens to undermine a military’s 
institutional interest in maintaining internal coherence, discipline, and morale.”218 This 
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may explain why the Egyptian military initially “relied on tear gas and water cannons to 
disperse the protestors,”219 however 
by January 29 it was evident that the military had decided to focus on protecting 
government buildings rather than intervene against the demonstrators. On January 31 a 
military spokesman explicitly declared on state TV that “the military understood the 
legitimacy of (the protesters’) demands” and that “the armed forces will not resort to 
use of force against our great people.” Consequently, aside from a short two days 
during the first week of protest when regime-sponsored thugs violently assaulted 




According to Mona El-Ghobashy, “when Hosni Mubarak appeared on television shortly 
after midnight on January 29 to announce his appointment of a new government, it was 
the first time in his tenure that he had been summoned to the podium by popular fiat.”221 
“People power” soon took over Tahrir Square, and “euphoria outweighed rational 
calculation of risk, cost” with thousands camping on the site day and night.222 As the 
protests swelled, other movements opted to “join the protest initiated by the April 6 
movement, including Youth for Justice and Freedom, the Popular Democratic Movement 
for Change (HASHD) and the NAC” (National Association for Change), as well as 
“political parties including the Ghad, Karama, Wafd and Democratic Front.”223 On Friday 
February 11, “angered by Mubarak's refusal to resign,” Egyptians responded with “their 
biggest demonstration yet. Ignoring fears that Mubarak might order a brutal crackdown, 
people of all ages and classes calmly gathered in central squares across the country and in 
unison demanded a change.”224 That day, following nearly 4 weeks of chaos in central 
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Cairo, Hosni Mubarak ceded power to a transitional council, an event which would have 
been unthinkable just one month prior. 
 
 
4.3) THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS THEORETICAL RELEVANCE 
Looking at the fate of Mubarak’s regime, one may surmise that Egypt’s uprising occurred 
not as a result of the collective will of the Egyptian people but because there was a 
sudden change in the balance of resources between the people and the regime.
225
 The 
ability to galvanize public sentiment through social media and launch swift mass protests 
is precisely where the shift in favor of the revolution occurred. Whereas public protests 
were previously undertaken by smaller groupings such as labour unions, Muslim brothers 
or left-wing organization, the January 25 revolt marked a drastic change in the 
organizers’ ability to bring together disparate groups. One explanation for the unexpected 
size and determination of the movement is that the development of networks of trust 
among participants from various socio-economic backgrounds was made possible by the 
broad dissemination of dissent through blogs and social media in the years leading up to 
revolution. Common identities were constructed online, as exemplified by the “We are all 
Khalid Sa’id” page, which provided a central emotional impetus for the revolution and 
challenged the misinformation propagated on state-owned Egyptian newspapers and 
television networks. Even satellite television networks, which were initially instrumental 
in disseminating the latest images on the ground, came to rely on social media for access 
to up-to-minute information. The key to understanding the effect of social media may be 
                                                        




to consider the structural aspects of social networks. Social networks offer easy and 
affordable access to social movements by reducing the costs of mobilization and 
accelerating the dissemination of information. Any citizen with an Internet connection or 
a modern mobile phone can access Facebook or Twitter where news, ideas and debates 
spread rapidly. “Tweets are broadcast directly to followers and indirectly to a larger 
audience,”226 which make them useful for gathering up-to-the-minute information which 
traditional media outlets may be unable or reluctant to provide. This means that users 
effectively create headlines for their extended networks to read and interpret, thereby 
creating an original narrative. In Egypt, social media enabled protesters to create a depict 
Mubarak’s regime as the embodiment of all of society’s ills, displacing individual 
grievances toward the greater goal of removing him from power. This was exemplified 
both in the content shared on the Khalid Sa’id facebook page and in the solidarity 
displayed in Tahrir Square during the protest, where the focus lay primarily on the 
common rejection of a corrupt dictatorship and a desire for democracy. The Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011 therefore marks a shift in the content of popular political expression 
in Egypt. Before the revolution, the dominant discourse had been imposed from the top-
down, a reality exacerbated by the 30-year state of emergency imposed by the Mubarak 
regime following Sadat’s assassination. The balance of power shifted in favor of the 
protesters because they now had the means to challenge dominant discourses with their 
own version of reality, told from the ground up. “Access to information”, writes Sohair 
Wastamy, “in a country with limited resources, served as the first catalyst for the 
Egyptian revolution that began January 25 and resulted 18 days later in the resignation of 





President Hosni Mubarak after almost 30 years in office.”227 The sudden shift occurred as 
fear was replaced by anger and resentment at the regime. While Mubarak’s network may 
have been far reaching, making its way into the homes of ordinary citizens through state 
run media, the network of those seeking to promote counter-hegemonic discourses in 
Egypt became much larger and grew to include millions of like-minded citizens. As 
protesters seized upon the new digital resources to reorganize and disseminate the 
information available to them, they developed the courage to defy summary arrests and 
police brutality and they successfully challenged the regime by creating new narratives of 
liberation and freedom. This in turn fueled the protests in Tahrir Square, whereby “social 
media became the means of choreography of assembly, facilitating the coalescence of the 
cosmopolitan Facebook youth around a common identity.”228 Egypt’s revolution 
therefore serves as a case study of social media not only allowing collective action to 
unfold, but also becoming a channel for the construction of the common identities 
essential to sparking solidarity, defiance and mass mobilization. Social media helped 
trigger an information cascade confirming the existence of shared-beliefs regarding the 
Mubarak regime among various sectors of society. Whereas the middle classes and elites 
are traditionally reluctant to express such dissent, Mario Diani points to “the contribution 
of ICT in facilitating the collective action capacity of the more advanced sectors of the 
urban middle classes,” which may have allowed Egyptians “to overcome the barriers (…) 
posed by a society fragmented through clan/religious line,” transforming previously 
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5) IRAN CASE STUDY  
5.1) Background Conditions 
The current leadership in Iran came to power in 1979 following a “revolutionary 
struggle” that ceded the state to Islamic ideologues.230 Today, the country’s conservative 
leadership “is tied together by strong personal bonds, shared political and economic 
interests, and a common strategic outlook. This leadership asserts power in the name of 
the Islamic Revolution’s ideology and values, and uses strong-arm tactics to intimidate its 
opponents.”231 According to Francis Fukuyama, “the Iranian constitution is a curious 
hybrid of authoritarian, theocratic and democratic elements.”232 It vests “sovereignty in 
God” and allows “popular elections for the presidency,” yet “all the democratic 
procedures and rights in the earlier sections of the constitution are qualified by certain 
powers reserved to a council of senior clerics.”233 The clerics exert “control over the 
armed forces,” reserve the right “to declare war,” and have “appointment powers over the 
judiciary, heads of media, army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.”234 
According to Lucan Way “the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 
helped to generate ideologically motivated and effective security forces including the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its paramilitary auxiliary, the Basij, which is 
considered one of the Islamic regime’s primary guarantors of domestic security.”235 
Regarding the Revolutionary Guard, Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr consider that its 
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resources, and the privileges of its personnel, would not likely be maintained if there 
were to be fundamental changes in the character of the Islamic Republic […] The 
Guard has viewed the expansion of civil-society activity as a potential danger in that it 




The Guard’s interest in and dedication to preserving the regime may help explain why 
Iran has so far survived years of international condemnation of its human rights records, 
and has proven resistant to calls for reform from within. “When challenged,” writes Elliot 
Hen-Tov, “the regime can resort to the ubiquitous presence of these armed masses to 
intimidate or suppress opposition.”237 Despite the presence of an electoral system that 
allowed for the election of a reformist president from 1989 to 1997, “the conservatives 
used antidemocratic measures” to regain authority over “all branches of government,” 
including the “presidency in 2005.”238 During the June 2005 election, the clerics “allowed 
only one explicitly reformist candidate to run against five conservatives,” paving the way 
for the “most conservative candidate,” Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad, to win the contest.239 
According to Elliot Hen-Tov, “as a former Revolutionary Guard commander and Basij 
militia instructor, he could rely on the Revolutionary Guards and Basij to engage in 
serious voter mobilization as well as outright vote rigging.”240 Ahmadinedjad’s triumph 
at the polls in June 2005 placed “all the organs of the Iranian state … in the hands of 
conservative hardliners,”241 effectively shutting out reformists from the decision making 
process and allowing the new president to pursue an “ideological, populist, and militarist 
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agenda.”242 He subsequently “bought political support among the poor and lower middle 
class by increasing pensions and government workers’ wages.”243 Reacting to discontent 
among Iran’s youth and intellectuals, Mir Hossein Mousavi, “Iran’s popular former prime 
minister,” announced on March 16, 2009, that he would run for president in the 
upcoming presidential elections.
244
 Known as a “moderate reformist with excellent 
academic qualifications,” Mousavi was perceived by Iranians as a “tolerant old-hand 
politician who could competently direct the country in the wake of the growing 
international tensions of the twenty-first century.”245 According to Iranian journalist 
Kourosh Ziabari, the “state-sponsored” pro-regime media outlets immediately “set out 
attacks against the reformists’ campaign,” discrediting Mousavi and depicting his 
followers as “impious and secular.”246 In the wake of these allegations, a number of 
websites aligned with Mousavi began severely criticizing Ahmadinedjad’s government, 
overshadowing the war of words that would unfold on the internet in the run-up to the 
election. 
 
Iran Internet And Social Media Penetration 
According to Henry Jenkins, “approximately 35 percent of the Iranian population” had 
“Internet access in 2009,” placing Iran “well above the national average across the 
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Middle East.” 247 Moreover, “there were more than 60,000 blogs in Iran, making it one of 
the most active blogging communities in the world.”248 Starting in “1993, when private 
use of modems for internet connections were permitted, internet connections went from 
5000 in 1997 to 1.326.000 in 2002.”249 By 2002, connections were numbered at “between 
7000-8000 in Tehran alone, and this is despite the fact that the government continuously 
closed down Internet caf s accused of providing access to websites otherwise banned or 
blocked in Iran.”250 The penetration rate was also accompanied by heavy censorship 
structures which enabled the Iranian authorities to monitor and limit web usage within the 
country. Undeterred by the regime’s intervention, the Internet evolved into a platform for 
Iranians to express political views, including dissident and counter-hegemonic speech. 
“Even before the elections,” writes James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation, 
“many Iranians advocated drastic social and political change. This use of the Internet 
persisted despite the fact that some bloggers had been jailed and tortured.”251 In a similar 
analysis, Ethan Zuckerman, cofounder of the Global Voices Project, writes “the country’s 
long history of governmental repression and tight regulation of Internet communication 
helped shape the savvy response among protesters.”252 In order to circumvent the censors, 
many Iranians had learned to use proxy connections to route around blocked websites, 
and were adept at spreading information through blogs and social media.
253
 In his 2009 
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analysis of the Iranian uprising, Carafano explained the technical aspects of Iranians’ 
capacity to sidestep censorship, 
The Iranian government censors the Internet with software that blocks access to 
forbidden Web sites or Internet Protocol (IP) address. Social applications like Twitter, 
however, are not tied to a particular Web site. Even if access to the Twitter site is 
restricted, users may, for example, access Twitter through other services, such as 
Twitterfall, which may not have been blocked by the Iranian government. Another 
means for bypassing government is data routing to a computer that acts as a proxy 
server. These servers employ IP addresses that are not on the government’s forbidden 
list; the servers then route the information to other Web sites, even those on the 
government’s restricted list.254 
 
Thanks to these ploys, technologically savvy Iranians possessed what Ethan Zuckerman 
describes as the “‘latent capacity’ of citizens, suggesting that these abilities to work 
around constraints become mobilized during moments of political crisis.”255 
The Opposition Mobilizes 
In 2008, Mohammad Sadeghi a 27 year-old “German-Iranian student” created a 
“Facebook support group” for the Mousavi campaign.256 Emulating the deft use “of 
social networking by the Obama campaign,” Mohammad ran the page as “a support 
group and news stream,” in hope that it would help condense Mousavi’s “online 
presence” through a central channel.257 In an interview conducted by the US Public 
Broadcasting Service (PBS), Sadeghi said “I liked Mir Hossein Mousavi from the start, 
he was an Islamic Republic statesman with a good track record. I also believed he 
represented the best chance for reform, as a middle-path figure who would attract 
conservative and moderate voters alike.”258 According to the PBS article, 
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Mohammad visited Iran in March, just when Mousavi formally announced his 
candidacy. He attended the presidential contender's first speech session in Tehran's 
working-class district of Nazi Abad, where he first heard the rallying motto ‘Every 
Iranian is a Campaign Manager.’ ‘It was evident from the outset that public 
broadcasting would be at the service of Ahmadinejad,’ he recalls. ‘I knew we would 
have to use non-conventional methods to compete.’259  
 
Mohammad subsequently uploaded “promotional material” and videos onto the Facebook 
page “for supporters to share and distribute, and also announced dates for provincial 
rallies, televised debates, and grassroots events.”260 Mousavi’s Facebook page soon 
reached “upwards of 50,000 members,”261 making Mousavi the first candidate in Iran’s 
electoral history to create a Facebook account and a digital platform where his supporters 
could befriend him, spread news on meetings and rallies, and contribute to the 
conversation about political agendas on his Facebook wall. 
5.2) THE 2009 ELECTION 
In the days preceding the Iranian presidential elections of June 2009, “a group of 
employees from Iran’s Interior Ministry issued an open letter revealing that they had been 
authorized to change votes.”262  Authorities were “unable to release the leaked 
document,” and the letter rapidly spread through email and was “hosted on websites both 
inside and outside the country”263 Iranian author Setareh Sabety reports “for a nation that 
has never really experienced free elections, the allegations of rigging came as no surprise. 
Yet no one expected that the government would conduct itself so blatantly, so 









audaciously. This conduct is why so many were offended, hurt, and angry.”264 Following 
the release of  “election results in favour of the incumbent candidate, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinedjad” on June 12th, “a huge number of unsatisfied Iranians took to the streets of 
Tehran and other major cities en masse, proclaiming ‘Where is my vote.’”265 The 
publicizing of the fraud allegation elicited a strong emotional response in Mousavi’s 
supporters, and thousands immediately took to the streets, with many “onlookers” stating 
“that they had not seen such disturbances since Iran's student-led uprisings in 1999.”266 
According to Carafano, “the Iranian government moved quickly to control the flow of 
public information,” including “blocking or interfering with access to mobile networks, 
the Internet, and satellite television, as well as restricting access to foreign and domestic 
members of the media.”267 Reporter Nahid Siamdoust writes “the entire mobile network 
was cut off from about late afternoon until midnight (…) Later, Internet connections were 
reduced to snail speed, and satellite television was almost entirely jammed. It was 
becoming impossible to report on events. The only “news” left unblocked was that 
propagated by state television.”268 Iranian dissidents were nonetheless able to bypass the 
censors and get their message out thanks in large part to years of preparation and 
experience in working around the system. Trita Parsi, who is current president of the 
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National Iranian American Council, reported “early images of large crowds of protesters 
sent out over Twitter emboldened others to join in.”269 She further goes on to write, 
Facebok messages circulated widely detailing how protesters could protect themselves 
when security forces arrived at the scene with batons and tear gas. And powerful 
Youtube videos of “Allahu Akbar” chants ringing out through the night illustrated the 
spirit and passion of the opposition’s movement defiance. All of these were important 
for sustaining the opposition during the first chaotic days and weeks, putting the lie to 
government propaganda efforts that portrayed protesters as elite youth from Northern 
Tehran only. With images and video circulating in real time showing the opposition 
spread throughout the country and across all segments of society, millions of ordinary 
Iranians had proof that they were not alone in their discontent; for the first time in the 
Islamic Republic, real substantive criticism of the entire ruling system was being aired 




In his research on events during the post-election upheaval, Howard writes, “despite 
government interference with digital services, SMS, Twitter, and other social media were 
used to coordinate massive turnout at protests across the country for Monday, June 
15.”271 On June 15th, The Guardian reported “more than 100,000 Iranians were protesting 
against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” in Tehran alone.272 The 
Iranian soon deployed a sophisticated censorship strategy, which included “coordinating 
cyber attacks on opposition websites, and limiting the country’s bandwidth to prevent 
users from uploading large files like photos and videos.”273 Despite the regime’s 
intervention, “Twitter survived,” allowing those few Iranians with access to the site to 
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spread dissent and protest tactics.
274




Twitter users are posting messages, known as tweets, with the term #IranElection, 
which allows users to search for all tweets on the subject. On Monday evening, 
Twitter was registering about 30 new posts a minute with that tag. One read, “We have 
no national press coverage in Iran, everyone should help spread Moussavi’s message. 
One Person = One Broadcaster. #IranElection.” The Twitter feed StopAhmadi calls 
itself the “Dedicated Twitter account for Moussavi supporters” and has more than 
6,000 followers. It links to a page on the photo-hosting site Flickr that includes dozens 
of pictures from the rally on Monday in Tehran. The feed Persiankiwi, which has more 
than 15,000 followers, sends users to a page in Persian that is hosted by Google and, in 
its only English text, says, “Due to widespread filters in Iran, please view this site to 




According to Carafano, “numerous other Web sites were set up as an information 
clearinghouse, including funneling details about the location of future protests, posting 
warnings on government crackdowns, and sharing updates of individuals injured, killed, 
arrested, or missing.”276 Philip Howard reports, “one week after the protest marches had 
begun, Google fast-tracked the development of a Farsi-language translator, and Facebook 
rushed out a beta translation of its content into Farsi.”277 In a move that is uniquely 
revealing of Twitter’s impact on the revolt, on June 16 the “U.S. State Department asked 
Twitter to delay a network upgrade that would have shut down service for a brief period 
during daylight hours in Tehran.”278 In their article about the role of new information 
technology during the Iranian crisis, Mahboub Hashem and Abeer Najjar write “while it 
is hard to visualize what exactly happened in the streets of Tehran during those days of 
the Iran election crisis, social media were there and opened a nonstop line of available 
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information to the public at a time when Iranian authority was trying to ban all 
individuals who did not please that authority.”279 According to reporters Brad Stone and 
Noam Cohen, “reports and links to photos” from the marches in Tehran became “the 
most popular topic on the service worldwide” with “Twitter feeds” acting as “virtual 
media offices for the supporters of the leading opposition candidate, Mir Hussein 
Moussavi.”280 The feed Mousavi1388 had over “7,000 followers” and was “filled with 
news of protests and exhortations to keep up the fight, in Persian and in English.”281 
Regarding the events in Iran, Howard concludes that digital technologies enabled 
“unprecedented activation of weak social ties,” which “brought the concerns of 
disaffected youth, cheated voters, and beaten protesters to the attention of the 
mullahs.”282  
The Death of Neda Agha Soltan 
On June 20, Neda Agha Soltan, a 26-year-old Iranian student, was shot by paramilitaries 
during a street demonstration.
283
 “Her death was caught on several mobile phone 
cameras,”284 and was immediately uploaded to YouTube. Distributed through a myriad of 
tweets, Facebook messages, and Youtube videos, “that sole incident was a galvanizing 
moment in Iran’s troubled election and ensuing uprising, and it shook the entire world 
and showed how powerful social media can be in such circumstances.”285 According to a 
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Guardian article, “Agha-Soltan was quickly lionised by an engaged online community 
inside and outside Iran.”286 In the days that followed, “Agha-Soltan's name became a 
battle cry for Iranian protesters, her face a symbol for the thousands of people who 
suffered under the government's heavy-handed crackdown.”287 Thanks to social media 
Agha-Soltan’s death became the centerpiece of renewed efforts by the dissidents and 
their supporters who rallied around her image to spark new protests and international 
condemnation.  According to a Time magazine article, Agha-Soltan's last moments 
became “probably the most widely witnessed death in human history.”288 Fearing that the 
opposition would turn Neda into a martyr, on June 25
th
 2009, the high-ranking cleric 
Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami “urged for Iran’s protest leaders to be punished ‘without 
mercy’ and said some should face execution.”289 In the following days, protests grew 
gradually smaller, and protesters settled on quiet public gatherings to mourn those killed 
during the upheaval. On June 30
th, 2009, Iran’s Guardian Council chose not to consider 
the complaints and protests, and validated the results of the 10th presidential election.
290
 
While sporadic protests did carry on, the flurry of activity that had marked the weeks 
following the election died out. According to a New York Times article, “Iran’s Islamic 
government gradually stamped out the 2009 protests through the shooting of 
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demonstrators, mass trials, torture, lengthy jail sentences and even executions of those 
taking part.”291  
 
5.3) IRAN CASE THEORETICAL IMPICATIONS 
The Social Media effect 
Twitter’s impact on the size and duration of the protest movement that followed the 2009 
presidential election is still unclear. Research suggests there were “only 19,000 registered 
Twitter users in Iran” in June 2009, “while estimates for the number of protestors range 
from a few hundred thousand to three million.”292 While it is clear that the majority of 
Iranians who took to the streets to protest the election were not using Twitter, the 
majority of them were responding to an information cascade initiated by an opposition 
that had made unprecedented use of social media during the campaign. As Philip Howard 
notes “it does not matter that the number of bloggers, twitterers, or internet users may 
seem small, because in a networked social moment only a few ‘brokers’ need to be using 
these tools to keep everyone up to date”293 The Moussavi campaign, which had limited 
access to state-run television and newspapers, turned to the internet and social media to 
spread its message, and became the initial ‘broker’ of the Iranian revolt. The team 
running Mousavi’s Facebook campaign effectively helped create a community of 
supporters, and activated a network of weak ties that transformed into a mass protest 
movement once the election results had been announced. Due to the government 
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censorship and the clandestine nature of social media use within Iran, it is hard to 
measure the precise impact of these services on the protest movement, however many 
observers believe that the movement is comparable in scope and scale to the 1979 
revolution, which had ousted then’s leadership in favor of Ayatollah Khomeini.294 In his 
most recent work on digital media in the Arab spring, Howard finds that the 2009 Iranian 
social movement lasted longer than expected under such a repressive regime, “drew in 
thousands more participants, and produced more witnesses to the brutal regime 
crackdown.”295 Howard attributes part of the credit to social media for “extending the life 
of civil disobedience.”296 The longevity of the protest is not only attributable to the 
dissemination and organization taking place on Facebook and Twitter, but also for letting 
people outside the country follow events. Social media helped broadcast the grievances 
of pro-reform Iranians to the world, sparking international indignation, encouragement 
and outrage. The fact that “Twitter enabled individual citizens to keep up-to-the-minute 
information flowing out from Iran’s borders,” 297 fueled the protesters’ fervor as they 
began to realize that expatriate communities all around the world were expressing 
solidarity and support.
 
This “unprecedented activation of weak social ties” therefore had 
an impact not only within Iran, but also on an international scale.
298
 According to Philip 
Howard, “between June 7 and 26, an estimated 480,000 Twitter users exchanged over 2 
million tweets, with Twitter streams peaking on election day at over 200,000 per 
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hour.”299 While the majority of this traffic came from the US and Europe, the fact that 
Iranians within Iran understood that the world was watching led to an increase in their 
social media outputs. According to Henry Jenkins “the protesters appealed directly to the 
desire among a large group of Twitter users to know what was happening and that 
group’s fantasy of exerting a greater influence over world events.”300 Another striking 
development was the shaming of CNN, which was perceived to have failed in its 
responsibility to cover the Iranian election protests. The twitter hashtag #CNNfail was 
established to lash out at CNN for not reporting on the hundreds of thousands of 
protesters who had taken to the streets on June 13
th
, 2009, resulting in CNN 
“significantly” increasing “its coverage of the events in Iran.”301 Despite the many 
perceived successes of the Iranian protest movement in 2009, Iranians were met with 
brutality and repression, and ultimately failed in bringing about any measurable change 
within Iran. The Iranian protest movement nonetheless stands out as a case study on how 
social media can affect a closed society in need of means to express dissent in defiance of 
an authoritarian regime willing to execute its own people to survive. Twitter emerged as 
the most important platform (above Facebook, Youtube and other social networks), 
because it allowed technologically savvy protesters, “particularly those affiliated with 
universities in Tehran, to organize and to follow updates by Mir Hossein Mousavi; by 
spreading the word about the location of government crackdowns and the threat of 
machine-gun-wielding.”302 Referring back to Eva Bellin’s thesis regarding the robustness 
of authoritarianism in the Middle East, it can be said that those machine-gun-wielding 
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soldiers, and the police forces dedicated to the regime, are the main reason why the 
current regime in Tehran is still standing. The events in Iran confirm Bellin’s hypothesis 
that many autocracies live on through “the presence of an exceptionally muscular 
coercive apparatus endowed with both the capacity and will to repress democratic 
initiatives originating from society.”303 As the enforcer of the Iran’s Islamic revolution, 
the coercive apparatus had the last word due in large part to the fact that it was willing to 
shoot, kill, imprison and torture protesters. This may be due to the fact that Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard derives its raison d’etre from its role as protector of the previous 
revolution, which toppled the American-backed Shah in 1979. Despite the fact that social 
media was used to facilitate mobilization, participation and information gathering, the 
Iranian ultimately uprising failed to even bring about its most modest goal - a vote 
recount - because the regime in Tehran kept control of a coercive apparatus faithfully 
committed to its goals. Whereas in Egypt Khalid Sa’id’s death had created an 
unprecedented opportunity for hundreds of thousands of activists and protesters to 
mobilize in reaction to police predation, in Iran it appears that Neda Agha Soltan’s death 
served both to galvanize the public but also to remind it that military snipers would spare 
no one. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, social media penetration in 2009 Iran 
was not up to the level of Egypt in 2011. The fact that unfettered access was reserved to 
those few technologically-savvy users who mastered the ‘proxy’ mechanism, means that 
the vast majority of the population was still reliant on cell phones and television for their 
information, both of which were intermittently shutdown by the regime during the 
election crisis. 
                                                        






6) NEW PROTEST MOVEMENTS 
6.1) A Worldwide Phenomenon 
The year 2013 saw the emergence of massive protest movements in India, Turkey, Brazil, 
Ukraine and Thailand. These movements appear to confirm an upsurge in mass protest 
movements in recent years, not only in the sheer number of protests but also in size and 
duration of the protests. A recent analysis of 843 protests in 87 counties between 2006 
and 2013 finds a “steady increase in the overall number of protests every year,” from 59 
protests in 2006 to 112 protests by mid-2013.
304
 The study also finds that “crowd 
estimates suggest that 37 events had one million or more protesters; some of those may 
well be the largest protests in history (eg. 100 million in India in 2013, 17 million in 
Egypt in 2013).”305 Since the publication of this research in September 2013, new 
movements have emerged in Thailand and Ukraine. For the purpose of my research, I 
will provide an overview of the movements that emerged in Ukraine and Turkey, tracing 
the processes of initial mass mobilization in each case. While Turkey and Ukraine cannot 
be labeled as authoritarian, they share qualities of authoritarianism, such as “displaying 
an increasingly tone-deaf, majoritarian-authoritarian tendency,” as exemplified by 
leaderships that “are plowing through with divisive projects,” despite clear public 
opposition.
306
 At the time of their respective protests, both Turkey and Ukraine had 
leaders widely seen to be unresponsive to the demands of huge swathes of the population, 
leading large segments of these populations to react with swift and protracted defiance. In 
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both cases the movements quickly developed into the largest protests these countries had 
witnessed in decades. These movements are relevant to my research because they display 
many attributes of social media inspired protests, such as “non-activist participation,” the 
“breaking of pluralistic ignorance,” and narratives structured on social media, which may 
help further reveal how social media may spark mass protests movements.
307
 Moreover, 
Turkey and Ukraine have broad social media penetration, with 35% of Turks reporting 
that they use social networking sites according to a 2012 Pew Research Center study, and 
a 34% internet penetration rate in Ukraine.
308
 For the purposes of my research, I will 
focus principally on the initial eruption of the protest movements, and the events that 
immediately preceded their occurrence. This will allow me to concentrate solely on the 
particular use of social media made in each case, and how it may have contributed to 
initiating mass movements. 
 
6.2) TURKEY 
In 2013, Turkey entered its 10th year under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan. Mr. Erdogan had successfully put together an “urban working-class, 
agrarian and neo-Islamist voter coalition in three consecutive election victories,” and led 
Turkey through a protracted period of economic growth, “job creation and infrastructure 
strengthening.”309 After his re-election on 2011, a shift was perceived in Mr. Erdogan’s 
style of governance, with many observers decrying his authoritarian ambitions and an 
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“assault on the secular republic” that developed throughout the 20th century.310 Many 
Turks believe that a “culture war” has emerged “against the country’s secular classes,” 
exemplified by a proposed legislation to ban “serving alcohol in public places,” and 
“legislation to curb the availability of abortion through Turkey’s national health 
insurance system.”311 As evidence of corruption and graft in the awarding of lucrative 
construction contracts emerged in 2012, many journalists lost their jobs, and the media 
companies who diffused such information were threatened with “huge tax bills on the 
order of the billions of dollars.”312 According to Reuters, “pro-government newspapers 
like Sabah, Star and Yeni Safak have largely portrayed the corruption investigations as a 
plot against Erdogan,” while the “senior editor at one of Turkey's largest dailies” became 
“the subject of a hate campaign on the Internet and in pro-government newspapers” after 
publishing incriminating evidence.
313
 Though echoes of corruption circulated, very little 
of it was ultimately covered in mainstream media, mainly because “large conglomerates” 
with ties to Prime Minister Erdogan “have purchased television channels and newspapers, 
which they use to run sycophantic coverage of the government.”314 Moreover, in 2013, 
for the “second consecutive year, jailed more journalists than any other country,” which 
is considered “the hallmark of an intolerant, repressive society,” according to Joel Simon, 
Executive Director of the Committee to Protect Journalists.
315
 It was in this climate of 
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mistrust between elements of Turkey’s secular civil society and the prime minister, that 
the Turkish protests were sparked in May 2013.  
 
6.2.1) The Gezi Park Movement 
In April 2013, a small gathering was planned in reaction to an announcement that Gezi 
Park, a green area in central Istanbul, would be replaced by an urban redevelopment 
project including the construction of a mosque and shopping mall. A “small group of 
activists”316 dedicated to conserving the park occupied the area “to protect trees that were 
to be cut down for the government’s project.”317 Launched as a hashtag on the Turkish 
twittersphere on April 10, 2013,  #ayagakalk (“stand up”) became the initial rallying call 
for small protest in Gezi park.
318
 On May 27, Taksim Solidarity - the first group to 
mobilize in defense of the park – assembled in Gezi to confront the tractors sent to uproot 
the trees.
319
 Initially uneventful, the small protest carried on into a second day, as 
approximately “50 people set up a camp among the trees.”320 In the early hours of the 
next morning, riot police took over the park, “using teargas and high-pressure water 
hoses (…) to disperse” the assembled protesters.321  The hashtag #OccupyGezi was 
instantly created on Twitter, creating a focal point for the delivery dozens of images of 
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protesters being attacked by police.
322
 The following images exemplifies the combination 
of photographs and tweets that helped generate popular anger and spur people to action: 
323
 
                                                        
322 Hunter Stuart, “#OccupyGezi Protests: Police Attack Peaceful Protesters In Istanbul.” 




Among the flurry of photographs and tweets sent out that day, one stands out from the 
others in its shock value, and provides a crucial insight into understanding how mass 
movements are created in the age of social media. Ceyda Sungur, an instructor from 
Istanbul’s Technical University urban planning department, had walked in to Gezi park to 
join the people assembled there.
324
 Dressed in “a red cotton dress,” and carrying nothing 
more than a “white shoulder bag,” she ended up face-to-face with a line of riot police, 
when “one of them crouched down and fired pepper spray directly into her face.”325 
Standing right beside her in that instant was “Reuters photographer, Osman Orsal,” who 
“captured the moment, creating an image which in the ensuing days went viral – shared 
via Facebook, Twitter and other social media.”326 The image of Sungur, now named the 
“lady in the red dress,” became an instant icon throughout Turkey, and was even 
“transformed into a giant billboard” in the coastal city of Izmir.327 The image is stark due 
to the photographer’s proximity to Sungur, who appears to weather the act of violence 
with abandon, simply standing her ground and allowing the police man to go on spraying 
her. The image was so revealing of the authorities’ disdain for the protesters in Gezi Park 
that it helped spur tens of thousands more people to action. Below is the photograph that 
became the dominant image of the unrest in Turkey: 
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On that same day, Twitter became “flooded with images of violence, including one of a 
protester on his or her knees using a sign that read ‘CHEMICAL TAYYIP’ as a shield 
against a police hose.”329 And on the following day, “activists made a call through social 
media for a major gathering in Gezi park”330 under the new hashtag “#direngeziparki 
(resist Gezi Park).”331 One example of how Tweets may attract protesters came from a 
popular Turkish actor who was present in Gezi Park on May 30. Memet Ali Alabora was 
with the assembled protesters, when he tweeted (translated from Turkish) “This is not 
only about Gezi Park, my friends, don’t you get it yet? Come on, come here.”332 A 
snapshot of the actor’s Twitter account taken at 2:45PM on May 30, shows that the Tweet 
had been retweeted (meaning that it was forwarded or resent by followers) 22,969 times. 
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In the absence of televised news surrounding the event, it seems highly likely that social 
media played a crucial role in urging large numbers of people to join the budding 
movement in Gezi Park. According to Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News, on the “evening” 
of May 30, “more than 10,000 people were at Gezi Park.”334 In the ensuing crackdown, at 
least a dozen protesters “were hospitalized with head traumas and respiratory injuries” 
linked to police brutality and tear gas.
 335
 Following another early morning police raid 
against the protesters on May 31
st
, and with Twitter ablaze with images of violence and 
calls for a “major gathering in the city center in the evening … By 8PM an estimated 
100,000 people were in the Beyoğlu district” of downtown Istanbul, with many marching 
“across the Bosphorus Bridge” on the Asian side of the city to defy riot police in Taksim 
Square.
336
 On May 31
st, students from New York University’s Social Media and Political 
Participation (SMaPP) laboratory began gathering and analyzing the social media 
response to the protests in Gezi Park. Staring at 4pm local time in Turkey, on Friday May 
31
st
 2013, the researchers found that  
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at least 2 million tweets mentioning hashtags related to the protest, such as 
#direngeziparkı (950,000 tweets), #occupygezi (170,000 tweets) or #geziparki (50,000 
tweets) have been sent (…) Even after midnight local time last night more than 3,000 
tweets about the protest were published every minute. What is unique about this 
particular case is how Twitter is being used to spread information about the 
demonstrations from the ground. Unlike some other recent uprisings, around 90% of 





The high volume of tweets sent out at the height of the protests can be attributed to the 
muted response in Turkish media, especially in terms of television coverage, which is 
considered to have been virtually “non-existent” during the first days of the movement.338 
“Turkish mainstream TV stations, including MNSBC-affiliated NTV and CNN Turk, 
failed to cover the protests,” with the most notable failure coming from CNN Turk, who 
infamously “chose to air a documentary about penguins” while the protests were raging 
in Gezi Park.
339
 A New Yorker article describing the events on the ground in Istanbul on 
May 31
st
 noted “the whole country seemed to be experiencing a cognitive disconnect, 
with Twitter saying one thing, the government saying another, and the television off on 
another planet. Twitter was the one everyone believed—even the people who were 
actually on the street.”340 Despite the absence of media coverage, hundreds of thousands 
of protesters took to Istanbul’s streets on May 31st, fearlessly confronting riot police, with 
tens of thousands marching across “the Bosphorus Bridge (…) to lend support in 
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Taksim.”341 Social movement scholar Zeynep Tufekci was in Istanbul throughout the 
course of events. On her blog Technosociology, she wrote,  
Unsurprisingly, social media, especially Twitter and Facebook have emerged as key 
protest and information conduits (…) Most protesters I talked with said that this just 
wouldn’t be possible without especially Twitter and Facebook. Most people heard of 
what was going on in the park during the initial police attack (when the protest was 
small, the police moved in, burned the tents and started cutting down the trees) via 
Twitter and Facebook and showed up to try to protect the park. They couldn’t have 




Selen Cimin, “a lawyer (…) present at the Gezi-Taksim protests since the beginning” 
similarly reports that social media was crucial to the uprising, stating “we use social 
media because it is the only thing we can use to show people what is really happening,” 
and “social media helped us to learn what was happening around [us], because we 
couldn’t follow [on] TV or anywhere.”343 As Zeynep Tufekci concludes, “Twitter had 
become the capillary structure of a movement without visible leaders, without 
institutional structure.”344 Although Ergodan had initially told reporters “even if hell 
breaks loose, those trees will be uprooted,”345 following the confrontations with 
protesters on May 31
st
, “an Istanbul court (…) ruled in favor of a petition by a local 
advocacy group and halted the project until parties submitted their legal arguments to 
court.”346 Moreover, Turkish business magnates “announced that they would not 
participate if a mall were built in Taksim amid growing unrest.”347 Erdogan conceded that 
                                                        
341 Ibid. 
342 Zeynep Tufecki, Technosociolgy Blog, June 21, 2013, http://technosociology.org/?p=1349. 
343 Kate Knibbs, “Arrested for Tweeting in Turkey: The Social Media Machine of #Occupy Gezi 
Movement,” Digital Trends, June 8 2013. http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/the-invaluable-role-
of-social-media-in-occupygezi-and-protest-culture/#!BTje9. 
344 Zeynep Tufecki, “Is the Internet good or bad? Yes” https://medium.com/matter/76d9913c6011 
345 Elif Batuman, “Occupy Gezi: Police Against Protesters In Istanbul.” 
346 Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Peaceful Protest Over Istanbul Park Turns Violent as Police Crack 
Down,” The New York Times, May 31, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/world/europe/police-
attack-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim-square.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp. 




the shopping mall development was uncertain, but “remained defiant on the government 
efforts” to rebuild Ottoman-style “Artillery Barracks in the area.”348 Undeterred by these 
concessions or by the police barricades set up around Gezi Park, “hundreds of thousands 
of people … continued to protest” in Istanbul and in “more than 40 Turkish cities” on the 




 Over the course of June 2013, “people from all walks of life” 
joined the street protests in cities across Turkey, prompting Turkish journalist Ayşe 
Çavdar to argue that that the movement had “fundamentally changed the understanding 
of participatory democracy in Turkey.”350 She is quoted in a Guardian article dated June 
5, 2013, “in my opinion we owe Tayyip Erdoğan a debt of gratitude. He brought us all 
together, he turned every inch of the pavement, every tree, and every flower into a 
political arena. We are very happy about what is happening in Turkey.”351 While the 
protesters ultimately retreated, the Gezi Park movement succeeded in shifting Erdogan’s 
image as an “unbeatable” politician, and “in December 2013, a corruption scandal” came 
to light with “most of the news related to the scandal, once again, primarily circulated on 
social media as the government attempted to quash the investigation.”352 As of March 28 
2014, the Turkish government has “blocked access” to both Twitter and Youtube 
throughout the country “amid national security concerns.”353 
 
6.3) TURKEY CASE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
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The Turkish protest movement is different from others here explored because it occurred 
in a context where Prime Minister Erdogan enjoyed mass popular support (exemplified 
by his three electoral victories), and therefore begs the question of why the protests 
occurred at that particular moment in his rule. While causal inferences are difficult to 
draw in the Turkish case, understanding what motivated hundreds of thousands of 
protesters to coalesce around the Gezi Park movement is crucial to revealing the 
dynamics of protest movements in digitally networked societies. What is clear from the 
protest tactics used in Istanbul is that social media “broke media censorship, created an 
original narrative, and allowed coordination,”354 especially in the early stages of protest 
action. Perhaps the most surprising, and telling feature of the protest movement in Turkey 
was the spontaneous nature of the protests, and the expression of solidarity among varied 
sectors of society, such as “university students (…) football fan club and radical hard left 
groupings.”355 The fact that these segments of society are more likely than others to have 
experienced police brutality or summary arrest, may help explain why they were 
galvanized by images of police brutality on social media at the start of the protests. 
Evidence of police brutality occurring in a familiar space in downtown Istanbul, against 
protesters who were initially peaceful appears to have worked as a “flashpoint,” turning 
simmering grievance into mass riots.
356
 In an article for the Center for Research and 
Policy on Turkey, Kıvanç Atak, a PhD. candidate at the European University Institute 
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writes, “bearing in mind the rich history of policing of demonstrations in Turkey, it is still 
curious why, in this case, police repression sparked off further mobilization on a large 
scale.”357 Mr. Atak suggests that the disproportionate “use of force by the police 
indisputably escalated public resentment and created a backlash in the form of sustained 
action.”358 However the question remains as to why this had not happened before. One of 
the explanations that emerges from Mr. Atak’s reflection is that “one needs to take into 
account individual and collective experiences with the police violence, as well as 
emotional determination to further protest as by-products of these experiences.”359 
Analysis of events in Istanbul suggests that initial episodes of police brutality had the 
effect of motivating protest participation, inspiring people from across the political 
spectrum to act together and simultaneously. The images flowing out of Gezi Park on 
social media during the first days of protest essentially acted as an emotional trigger for 
those seeking to express frustration with the regime. The fact that hundreds of thousands 
of protesters gathered in the immediate aftermath of the first night of violence in Gezi 
park indicates that a large subclass of Turks were ready and willing to engage in protest 
given the right trigger. In the case of the Gezi park police crackdown, graphic 
photographs and videos of rampant police abuse, combined with emotional calls to 
action, served as enough of a rallying call. Zeynep Tufekci joined the movement in 
Istanbul during the first week of protests and questioned a number of protesters about 
what had brought them out to Gezi Park. She writes “many told me that the reality gap 
between television and Twitter had brought them to Gezi. ‘I knew there was censorship 
on TV,’ one told me. ‘But it wasn’t until Twitter came along I realized how bad it was. 







It’s one thing to be insulted discreetly, and another to be insulted so brazenly. I had to 
come here.’”360 While it is impossible to judge whether social media alone gave each 
individual protester the sufficient feeling of anger and indignation needed to join the 
protest, analysis suggest that social media was crucial in providing information about the 
protest, and in creating a new “tactical repertoire,” which protest participants then 
employed to produce “disseminate, and contest the language and narratives used to 
describe a movement.”361 Hence social media allowed a small group of individuals which 
Sidney Tarrow calls “early risers” to create and communicate their own representation of 
reality, exposing an opportunity for protest where none had previously existed. Mr. 
Erdogan’s overwhelming popularity, combined with the lack of coverage of his excesses 
on state television may have dissuaded many Turks from previously expressing 
grievances or frustrations at the regime’s arrogance. In this sense, police brutality against 
seemingly benign protesters trying to protect one of Istanbul’s last green areas sparked 
the ire of tens of thousands of individuals and helped them summon the courage to take to 
the streets. Follow-up episodes of police brutality over the coming days, combined to Mr. 
Erdogan’s insults and disdain towards the protesters, served to galvanize the masses 
across the country, igniting Turkey’s major urban centers for the entire month of June 
2013. 
6.4) UKRAINE 
In the aftermath of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” of 2004, the country took steps 
towards “greater media freedom” through regulation that promised citizens “access to 
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information” and “protect[ed] the professional activities of journalists.”362 However with 
the election of Victor Yanukovych in 2010, press freedom had gradually weakened as the 
President “and his ruling ‘Party of Regions’ cracked down on the country’s opposition, 
consolidated their influence over the national broadcast media, and approved restrictive 
laws in the parliament that led to greater media self-censorship.”363 Moreover, a “highly 
politicized judicial system ensured that Yanukovych’s main political rival, former prime 
minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, remained in prison under a seven-year sentence that was 
imposed in 2011 for her alleged mishandling of natural gas negotiations with Russia in 
2009.”364 It was in this stifling political climate that on November 21st, 2013, Ukraine 
declared “that it had suspended its plans to sign far-reaching political and trade 
agreements with the European Union and said it would instead pursue new partnerships 
with a competing trade bloc of former Soviet states.”365 The sudden decision was 
unsettling because the agreement had come as a “result of years of negotiations” and 
“represented a confirmation, especially for Ukraine’s educated youth, that theirs was a 
normal country—part of Europe, not some ‘Little Russia’ appendage of the hegemon to 
the north.”366 Hundreds of people instantly took to the streets of Kiev, defying “a court 
ban on protests,” to occupy Independence Square, the site of the 2004 Orange 
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 “Participants in the spontaneous protest gave it a name and a twitter 
hashtag: EuroMaidan,” a term combining the words ‘Europe’ and ‘Maidan’ (Ukrainian 
for ‘square’).368 The growth of the movement is attributed to the creation of this Twitter 
hashtag, which was “used more than 21,000 times by Friday” November 22nd, as 
“overnight opposition demonstrations were held” in cities across Ukraine.369 One 
example is the tweet sent out on November 21
st
 by a well-known investigative journalist 
named Mustafa Nayyem, “who first called on citizens via Twitter to mobilize at 
Independence Square,” with the tweet “Meet at 22:30 under the monument of 
Independence. Dress warmly; take umbrellas, tea, coffee, and friends.”370 As a small 
group occupied the square, social media were “buzzing with rallying calls for a major 
protest on Sunday,” November 24th.371 In a BBC article published on November 22, 
Olexiy Solohubenko, an executive editor at BBC Global News and “former head of the 
BBC’s Ukrainian service,” is quoted expressing doubt that the call to mass protest would 
be heard, saying “many people tell you of their protest fatigue, and many believe that not 
just the numbers but the spirit of the Orange Revolution will hardly be repeated - 
whatever the tools.”372 Unexpectedly, the rally in Kiev on November 24 drew in an 
estimated “100,000 to 250,000 people,”373 making it the largest public gathering since 
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Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004. Following the success of the march, a group of 
dedicated “peaceful” activists stayed on in Independence square, organizing concerts and 
rallies.
374
 In an unprecedented turn of events, the morning of November 30
th
 saw riot 
police invade Independence square, “swinging truncheons and spraying bursts of tear gas 
to forcibly break up a crowd.”375 The unrestrained show of force was captured on pictures 
and video and instantly made available online, leading the EuroMaidan Facebook page to 
become the “fastest-growing page in the Ukrainian segment of the social network,” 
garnering “over 102,000 subscribers”.376 On Twitter, two EuroMaidan pages garnered 
“tens of thousands of followers, who use the hashtag #Euromaidan and Ukrainian and 
Russian equivalents #Євромайдан #Евромайдан to filter news about the 
demonstrations.”377 According to the Kyiv Post, Ukraine’s English-language newspaper,  
Twitter, which until now has been underutilized in Ukraine, finally became a main and 
important source of information, simultaneously with Facebook. On Nov. 26 every 
one or two seconds a message with the hashtag #euromaidan was posted (…) On Nov. 





On December 1, 2013, “after a coordinated effort by opposition parties” and civil society, 
“500,000 to 800,000 people joined the protests in Kiev.”379 Starting on November 27, 
interviewers for a “British Academy funded survey,” began gathering data and 
“conducting surveys at Kiev protest sites for two to three hours each day,” using “a strict 
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random sampling strategy” whereby “only every sixth protester was approached.”380 
1,203 protesters took part in the surveys, complimented with “daily documentation of 
protest slogans and signage (digital video and photography), as well as rapid interviews 
with a smaller sample of protesters (n= 200).”381 Data from the Ukrainian Protest Project 
show that the movement was composed of a “cross-cleavage coalition” of citizens 
representing “three age groups (under 30, 30 to 55, and 55-plus), at least two religious 
cleavages (Catholic and Orthodox), and they included large numbers of Russophones (30 
percent) and participants who had previously voted for Yanukovych (19 percent) and the 
Party of Regions (15 to 19 percent).”382 Researchers also asked protesters how they 
received information about the protests, and found that “large numbers of protesters 
indicated that they had learned about the protests from internet sites like Facebook (49 
percent), and VKontakte (a Facebook-like social media site that is popular among 
Russian speakers, 35 percent).”383 The findings are summarized in the graph below: 
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While the graph clearly shows that television and networks of strong ties were the leading 
contributor to protesters’ choice of when and where to join the movement, Facebook and 
Internet news follow close behind. This may be indicative of the broad cross-section of 
the population present at the EuroMaidan protests, with older protesters more likely to 
follow events on television and younger protesters on Internet and social media. Another 
questionnaire sought to understand the specifics of how, when and where protesters chose 
to join the protest. In her discussion of the findings, lead researcher Olga Onuch writes 
                                                        





“when we interviewed protesters, they explained that they found Facebook and Internet 
news sites more reliable sources of information than television because they gave a 
‘general idea of the mood and what was going-on.’”385 This reveals that many protesters 
found internet and social media sources to be more trustworthy, and to be more 
accurately reflective of events of the grounds. Another preliminary finding of the Ukraine 
Protest Project is a “pattern whereby a sign or slogan first goes viral on Facebook, and 
then seems to show up more often in protester signs.”386 This reinforces the notion that 
social media is influential in defining the demands of protesters, and in creating a 
language of contention for protesters to articulate their grievances, as exemplified by the 
“UKRAINEUKRAINE” poster displayed throughout the first weeks of protest.387 This 
also suggests an “Internet-to-the-streets directionality of claims and framing of 
demands,”388 punctuated by self-reinforcing cycles of protesters joining the movements 
and posting similar personalized messages to their Facebook and Twitter pages for their 
digital networks to see. With mottos such as “a European future for Ukraine,” and 
“Ukraine is Europe,” a new language of contention was created and disseminated almost 
instantly throughout Ukraine, with the term EuroMaidan gaining broad diffusion both 
locally and across international media outlets.
389
 While the initial impetus for protest was 
a rapprochement to the EU, the movements was soon co-opted by extremist right-wing 
parties who capitalized on the budding chaos to expound their own demands. According 
to researchers Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse “these groups began coordinating teams 
of 100 to 200 armed individuals who walked around the city center wearing hard hats, 
                                                        








holding bats, chanting nationalist slogans” and engaging riot police in violent 
confrontations, causing protests to “shrink in size” following “each violent encounter.”390 
As protest tactics grew to include “extreme violent repertoires, such as Molotov cocktails 
and the increasing use of nationalist symbols,” Kiev soon became a battleground for a 
deeper cultural conflict within the country.
391
 In the first weeks of February 2014, Kiev 
descended into urban warfare as protesters took control of the city center, leading 
president Yanukovych to flee the country on February 22, 2014. 
 
7) CASE DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
7.1) SOCIAL MEDIA AND MASS UPRISINGS 
Social media did not cause the uprisings in Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Longstanding grievances regarding corrupt, oppressive or paternalistic governments 
sowed the seeds of protest. Added to these were an array of concerns - different in each 
case - regarding growing inequalities, the rising cost of living, fraudulent elections, police 
brutality, and tone-deaf leaderships displaying utter disregard for the grievances of 
significant segments of their populations. However these concerns alone cannot explain 
the sudden flurry of mass protests after years, often decades, of relative quiescence. 
Research has shown that social and economic grievances cannot create social movements 
on their own, and the literature on unexpected revolutions clearly demonstrates that 
preference falsiﬁcation is the norm under authoritarian regimes, where the fear of reprisal 
delays the onset of mass mobilization. Analyses of the cases of Egypt, Iran, Turkey and 
Ukraine yields new insights about the impact of the viral communication that preceded 
                                                        





recent episodes of mass protest. The cases suggest that social media allowed for the 
speedy creation of mass movements by helping persuade indignant citizens to occupy 
public spaces in defiance of repressive regimes. In each case the delivery of personalized 
political messages and shocking images to diverse audiences via social media was 
followed – often within hours –  by activists occupying public places in protest of 
government action. In each case, the early risers succeeded in employing social media to 
produce massive swells of additional protesters bent on joining the initial movement. 
Such mobilization grew out of the communication between individuals employing 
technologies that “enables the personal framing of communication in ways that do not 
entail shifts in categorical thinking,” yet allows them to “join with others as connectivity 
is established, filtered, and coordinated in networks organized by both human and 
technological agents.”392  
 
Technologically Mediated Personal Connectivity 
The mechanism that enables digitally mediated connectivity to occur appears to be firmly 
rooted in the nature of the political communication propagated via social media. 
Facebook, Twitter and other social media allow individuals to air their grievances and 
broadcast their calls-to-action through short personalized messages and directives, 
accompanied by visual evidence of perceived injustices. The instant sharing of this 
content through digital networks appears to strip away conventional barriers to political 
action, and occasionally succeeds in convincing citizens under authoritarian regimes to 
overcome their fear or reluctance to protest. One of the most telling aspects of the 
technologically mediated connectivity which led to the mass protests in my case studies 
                                                        




is that the majority of protesters initially rallied around movements largely devoid of 
traditional ideological slogans, and succeeded in assembling protesters across class lines. 
While Ukraine’s movement was eventually co-opted by far-right ideologues, this only 
occurred once the initial mass movement was entrenched and occupying central Kiev. 
Moreover, the move was largely tolerated by an opposition who saw the emergence of 
violent repertoires of contention as a solution to the 3-month stalemate between the 
protesters and President Yanukovych. The spark for mass protest action in the cases 
Ukraine and Turkey were images of police brutality against small gatherings in public 
squares, diffused via social media to broad networks of technologically connected 
individuals. In both cases, quasi-authoritarian leaders wishing to quell the initial uprising 
were faced within days with massive uprisings, forcing them to back down or negotiate 
with the activists. 
 
7.2) CASE BY CASE DISCUSSION 
Turkey stands out from the other cases because the country had experienced consistent 
economic growth and stability over the previous decade, and because most protesters 
were not demanding the outright ouster of the prime minister. Instead, they were reacting 
to a Prime Minister who had “eroded checks and balances by placing supporters in all 
branches of government,” and often awarded lucrative construction contracts “to those 
who curried favor with the government.”393 Adding to their anger was the growth of 
militarized police forces known for their excessive responses to small-scale protests, and 
a mainstream media system largely owned by companies favorable to the government. 
Following the publicizing of the brutal crackdown on Gezi Park protesters, the thrice 
                                                        




reelected president was faced with a sudden onrush of hundreds of thousands of 
protesters in Istanbul and other major cities, generating protest frames through Twitter 
and Facebook, galvanizing masses, and directing the locations of protest activity 
throughout the country. Turkey’s Gezi Park movement also succeeded in bypassing and 
shaming CNN Turk who had completely failed to report on the events, and as of April 
2014 activists still use social media to reveal details of an ongoing corruption inquiry 
targeting Prime Minister Erdogan.
394
 In Ukraine, events took a similar turn when 
overzealous riot police attacked peaceful protesters in Kiev’s Independence Square, 
sending out a flurry of activity on social networks, leading hundreds of thousands of 
angry protesters to Independence Square to demand greater democracy and transparency.  
In Egypt, years of isolated, tentative protests by labor unions, youth movements 
and fringe political parties were crystallized into a uniform movement on January 25
th
 
2011, when hundreds of thousands came out to protest against Hosni Mubarak’s 
authoritarian rule following the overthrow of Tunisia’s president. The initial protest 
experiments led by the Kefaya movement, followed by the growth of Facebook and 
social media penetration throughout the country suggests that the revolution was initially 
sparked through a crucial evolution in activist tactics and repertoires of contention. The 
research I have reviewed shows that Khalid Sa’id’s murder, and the Facebook page 
created posthumously in his name, which displayed photographs of his face disfigured by 
a brutal beating at the hands of corrupt police officers, became a rallying point against 
rampant abuse under Mubarak’s regime. The opportunities for digital activism that arose 
online following the death of Khalid Sa’id opened the possibility for other dissidents to 
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join the movement, and led to an outpour of emotion and solidarity between disparate 
segments of the Egyptian public. Zeynep Tufekci’s subsequent research has shown that 
those who reported using blogs, Facebook and Twitter for obtaining information and 
communicating about the protests were more likely to join the protests on the first day. 
One example of the type of messaging that galvanized protest action is the stark 
premonition about the fate of Mubarak, expressed by a Facebook user named Mohamed 
Issa who wrote the following message of the Facebook wall of the the Kalid Sa’id page: 
“January 25th is the beginning, the days that follow will force the tyrant to leave.”395  
In Iran, the creation of a Facebook page in support of opposition leader Hossein 
Mousavi, combined with the diffusion of protest tactics on this same page and via Twitter 
feeds following the publicizing of skewed election results, engendered the greatest protest 
movements since the Islamic revolution on 1979. Youtube videos of defiant Tehran 
residents taking to the streets and chanting on their rooftops, and Twitter feeds 
coordinating protest action presented the regime with its greatest challenge since student 
protests in 1999. When the regime shut down the communication infrastructure, Iranians 
experienced in circumventing official censorship set-up proxy connections in order to 
maintain their access to internet and social media, thereby prolonging their ability to 
coordinate and disseminate their movement. Iran also marks the first case in which social 
media was used to force the hand of a major international network such as CNN, who 
was shamed into covering the Iranian protest movement after failing to do so for the first 
3 days of activity. Of the four cases studied in this paper, the Iranian movement was the 
least successful in achieving its aims, but the most successful in breaking through heavy 
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censorship structures and exposing its grievances to the international community. In the 
absence of accurate television media coverage within Iran, social media filled the gap by 
providing outlets for disseminating images of violence in Tehran’s streets throughout 
June 2009. However Iran stands in stark difference to the other cases in that the police 
and military forces were fully dedicated to preserving a regime which they were created 
to protect, engaging in the indiscriminate killing of protesters during the violent 
crackdown of June 20, 2009. While social did help create, coordinate, and disseminate a 
movement, it was powerless in the face of a coercive apparatus willing to kill protesters 
en masse - other than in exposing the brutality to the international community. Moreover, 
Iran is the earliest case study analyzed in this paper, and therefore had the lowest social 
media penetration rate here represented. The combination of low penetration and heavy 
censorship of other outlets such as newspapers and television may explain why the 
movement was successfully quashed by the regime. Nonetheless, all the cases stand out 
as examples of digitally enhanced mass movements whereby the grievances of various 
sub-groups and social classes were transformed into targeted action against central 
leaderships, materializing in episodes of coordinated mass contention whereby hundreds 
of thousands of people defied established authorities by fusing their individual grievances 








The Gezi Park protest in Istanbul is a useful case study for controlling for television’s 
role, because major networks within Turkey completely failed to cover the budding 
protests or even report on events happening in downtown Istanbul. After the violent 
police crackdown on the peaceful Gezi Park protest on the morning of Friday May 31
st
, at 
least 2 million tweets regarding the event were sent out between 4pm and midnight on 
Friday alone, with over 90% of tweets originating from within Turkey.
396
 In the absence 
of local television coverage, social media allowed users to generate their own coverage, 
“live-tweeting the protests as well as using smart-phones to live stream video of the 
protests.”397 These social media feeds also became the main funnel for channeling 
information to Western news media. A similar situation occurred in Iran on June 6
th
, 
2009 when the regime shut down the entire communication infrastructure as a massive 
movement erupted in the wake of fraudulent election results. Iranian activists trained in 
circumventing the regime’s censorship structures delivered a stream of messages, 
pictures and video’s from Iran's streets via Twitter. The failure of international media 
outlets to pick up on events in Tehran led to Twitter-hosted “outbursts of fury against 
CNN and other news organizations”, forcing the networks to increase their coverage of 
the crisis in Iran.
398
 Moreover, the speed and coordination with which modern protest 
movements are developing is casting doubt on traditional media’s ability to accurately 
report on events, leading many activists to turn to social media for diffusion on tactics 
and messages. Moreover television networks are increasingly taking their cues from 
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social media in that citizen journalists are often the first to upload images of protest 
activity, leading networks to follow the trail of activism on social media for the latest up-
to-the-minute information. While satellite television broadcasts undoubtedly played a role 
in informing certain publics about events Egypt and Ukraine, it was the combination of 
satellite news with social media messaging and live-streaming which is likely to have 
generated and sustained the initial push for mass mobilization. 
7.4) CROSS CASE ANALYSIS AND THEORY INFERENCE 
The four cases analyzed in this paper reveal that an evolution is occurring in the tactics 
available for generating contentious political action and politicizing large segments of 
populations under authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian regimes. Egypt, Iran, Turkey and 
Ukraine stand as case studies where people responded immediately and emotionally to 
perceived injustices being carried out with impunity right before their eyes. These 
injustices sparked movements that led to the downfall Mubarak in Egypt, and 
Yanukovych in Ukraine, the rescinding of the Gezi Park ruling in Turkey and Iran’s 
largest social movement since its 1979 revolution, combined with worldwide attention 
and condemnation of rampant electoral fraud in the Islamic Republic. These reactions 
speak to the benefits of spreading messages via these services. Speed, diffusion, and 
coordination were greatly enhanced thanks to the ability to deliver stark images and 
poignant messages, accompanied by visual depictions of events on the ground, faster than 
and more accurately than any other medium. My analysis suggests that social media’s 
main contribution to protest movements is the ability to galvanize activists and previously 
un-politicized citizens through personalized messages, accompanied by photographic or 




These messages seems to elicit strong emotional responses in would-be protesters as they 
offend their sense of justice while providing an immediate opportunity to react, hand in 
hand with thousands of others. The personalization of contentious political action may 
thus be allowing a wide variety of “individuals and groups to contribute to contentious 
conversations by virtue of their access to a smartphone, a computer, or a server,” and to 
participate to protest action in immediate response to injustices which their consciences 
consider too heavy to bear.
399
 This may explain why representation of police brutality 
played an important role in galvanizing protesters in all cases, motivating hundreds of 
thousands to act out after seeing streams of images and messages on Facebook and 
Twitter.  
 
7.4.1) The Personalization of the message 
In a recent study on voting behavior in the United States, published in the international 
science journal Nature, “a randomized controlled trial of political mobilization messages 
delivered to 61 million Facebook users,”400 found conclusive evidence that “a message 
designed to encourage people to vote so that it came with affirmation from a person’s 
social network, rather than being impersonal … could persuade more people to 
participate in an election.”401 The results show that Facebook messages directly 
influenced “political self-expression, information seeking and real-world voting 
behaviour of millions of people.”402 Furthermore, the messages extended their reach and 
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influence to the recipients’ extended networks, suggesting that personalized online 
messages might influence political mobilization across a broad spectrum of ties.
403
 My 
analysis of 4 case studies with instances of mass mobilization following politically 
contentious social media use by activists indicates that social media may play a similar 
role for protest participation as it does for voter turnout. Participation to and interaction 
with politically contentious social media condenses individual grievances regarding the 
various abuses of an authoritarian regime into inclusive and emotional rallying calls 
against the regime as a whole. My research shows that the publicizing of a recent 
injustice via social media, combined with the creation of personalized and emotionally 
salient content may spark inclusive mass protest movements among citizens with 
grievances, especially if the regime reacts with further abuse such as police brutality 
against peaceful protesters. Through my process-tracing analysis of the case studies, I 
have indentified certain causal mechanisms that appear to lead to mass protest under 
authoritarian regimes, such as the immediate publicizing of an egregious injustice on 
social media, combined with personalized calls-to-action and visual evidence of initial 
protest activity. These processes seem to increase the likelihood that small protests will 
scale-up to mass movements as more aggrieved individuals gain awareness of the 
budding movement. Hence, the hypothesis I infer from the case studies, and which I 
recommend for future testing in similar cases is: the use of social media for the 
production of personalized emotionally salient political content denouncing abuses under 
authoritarian regimes will allow activists to politicize large segments of the population 
and alter the cost-benefit analysis of protest action by exposing immediate opportunities 
for protest, thereby increasing the variable incidence of mass protest action.  







The retroactive analysis of protest phenomena does not necessarily explain the complex 
reasoning behind the timing and location of their emergence. Many cases with similar 
political and social conditions will be observed with no apparent sign of mass 
mobilization. For this reason, I chose to contextualize and process-trace four cases of 
mass mobilization, in hope of observing the organizational and individual benefits of 
politically contentious social media use in each case. However this analysis does not 
necessarily indicate that future episodes will follow similar patterns. One of the main 
impediments to the emergence of future digitally media political contention will be the 
lessons learned by authoritarian regimes between 2009 and 2013. The upheaval observed 
round the world during those years has prompted those regimes to monitor, control and 
censor access to social media. In 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan passed an “Internet 
censorship and surveillance law that makes it easier for his government to shut down 
websites without judicial oversight.”404 In a testament to social media’s power, Mr. 
Erdogan is currently engaged in efforts to ban Facebook and Youtube, arguing that 
opponents use it to attack him through ongoing allegations of corruption.
405
 In Syria, 
regime opponents operate under the “widespread belief that government hackers are 
browsing the Internet to search for dissidents and tracking them down via social media 
websites.”406 This follows allegations by “U.S. State officials that Iran [has] started 
providing the Syrian government with sophisticated surveillance equipment to assist in 
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tracking down opponents via the Internet.” 407 These same officials claim that “the 
techniques were used in Iran to crush a pro-democracy ‘Green Movement’ in 2009.”408 
The expanding ubiquity of internet penetration and social media access will therefore not 
necessarily translate to increased mass movements, especially if activists fear that they 
can be watched and singled out by the regime. Zeynep Tufekci captures the essence of 
this contradiction when she writes “Internet technology lets us peel away layers of 
divisions and distractions and interact with one another, human to human. At the same 
time, the powerful are looking at those very interactions, and using them to figure out 
how to make us more compliant.”409 Another crucial concern is whether the heightened 
scrutiny of authoritarian regimes “will translate into heightened accountability and actual 
improvements in governance and democracy.”410 Recent events in Ukraine and Egypt 
suggest that while social media may be a powerful tool for organizing and fomenting 
dissent, their horizontal structure is less useful for articulating coherent policies and 





The idea that social media may serve to encourage people to rise up against authoritarian 
rulers is reminiscent of an argument advanced by American philosopher John Dewey. 
Dewey believed that dictatorships endure not just through force and intimidation, but also 
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by controlling public opinion and ideas through propaganda. Dewey argues that 
totalitarian states survive by controlling public’s consciousness through cinema, 
newspapers, television networks, and sporting events. “A totalitarian state” wrote Dewey, 
“is committed to the control of the whole life of all its subjects by its hold over feelings, 
desires, emotions, as well as opinions.”411 However this control will begin to unravel if 
citizens “gain the potential to expose government abuses of power,” and may eventually 
lead the public to overturn the government “if is cast as illegitimate, violent, dishonest, or 
untrustworthy.”412 As people increasingly gain the capacity to obtain and circulate 
information on social media, this information may shape public opinion and lead to an 
increase in mass mobilization against oppressors. This paper has shown that certain 
prerequisites must occur for these phenomena to take place, including the personalization 
of political messages and the immediate diffusion of emotionally salient images able to 
convince individuals that the regime has committed acts that are too heavy to bear with 
quiescence. Under those circumstances, individuals may find that social media reveals 
opportunities they had not yet perceived, such as the safety of numbers, and the potential 
to finally confront a regime long held to be unshakeable. In this regard, I have developed 
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